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LEADERSHIP IN THE JUNIOR NAVAL
OFFICER.

by

Charles E. McCombs

Thesis
M18

LEADERSHIP IN THE JUNIOR NAVAL OFFICER:
A STUDY OF SELECTION, TRAINING AND EVALUATION.

A Thesis Presented for the
Degree of Master of Science
in Public Administration.

By

Chas. E. McCombs, S.S.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

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INTRODUCTION

This paper has been prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Graduate School, Ohio State University, in which the degree of Master of Science in Public Administration is sought, and with the requirements of the Navy Department under whose auspices the graduate work was performed.

A great deal has been written on the subject of leadership. The writer has drawn upon these published writings, as well as the advice of his professors, the opinions of brothers-in-arms and upon the lessons of his own experience in group activity.

The main difficulty in the development of leadership appears to be the lack of well defined criteria upon which to judge the success of leaders and upon which to base any course of training designed to improve or develop those qualities or characteristics which seem to contribute most to the ability of one individual to exert a dominant and favorable influence in group activities under greatly varying circumstances.

Chapter I of this paper includes a classification of social, political and military leadership in which the method of direction is considered under the following types:

(1) laissez-faire, (2) democratic and (3) authoritarian. The author commits himself early by submitting to criticism his own definition of leadership but hastens to explain that there is no such thing as a

leader per se. Leadership identity is dependent upon the situation prevailing and the characteristics of the individuals at hand. There follows a summary of recently reported studies of the qualities which characterize social leaders who were considered to have been successful in the direction of scholastic, social and business group activity.

The author seeks to describe certain human traits which seem to contribute to three basic qualities of a leader. The basic qualities, the exercise of which seem to be necessary in achieving successful leadership are: (1) an understanding of human behavior, (2) good judgment and (3) experience. ✓

An understanding of human behavior is necessary in order to comprehend and anticipate the reactions which result from stimuli presented in the course of daily association with large groups of men, striving under conditions of variable strain and environment, to accomplish, cooperatively, definitely assigned tasks.

Good judgment enables the leader to analyze, with despatch, a situation or problem and to visualize the possible solutions and their accompanying advantages and disadvantages. It enables him to weigh, with a greater degree of confidence, the factors involved and, with the background of professional knowledge, to determine and pursue that course of action which will expeditiously and efficiently bring successful accomplishment into being.

Experience is the individual's summation of past situations and results in a mental reorganization which influences his ability to adjust to present situations. In the field of leadership, experience

lends confidence to the leader and to the led.

The general criteria by which a successful naval officer may be judged are discussed in Chapter II. An interpretation of the term "born leader" is discussed briefly. Various pertinent points in the development of leadership qualities are pointed out and the importance of a model training organization is emphasized. The fact that most trainees go through a critical period of adjustment and that many of them select instructors as early models of admiration and emulation emphasizes the importance of personality in those associated with the training organization.

In Chapter III the author has reviewed the leadership training program of the U.S. Naval Academy and briefly compared it with the training of midshipmen in civilian universities under the Holloway Plan. A detailed comparison of the time devoted to direct leadership training with the time devoted primarily to the mastery of technical studies indicates an apparent overweighting of the importance of technical ability. The importance of selecting instructors of outstanding ability in the execution of leadership training is pointed out. The proper selection and adjustment of trainees is discussed.

In Chapter IV are discussed five current problems which appear to be worthy of extensive study in an effort to improve the quality of young leaders who, having completed the prescribed course of training, go out to the operating units as commissioned junior naval officers. The problems discussed include: (1) the selection of

candidates for training, (2) the selection of instructors, (3) improvement and balancing of the training program, (4) the evaluation of demonstrated leadership ability.

The conclusions and recommendations contained in Chapter V are, for the most part, general and concern the five current problems previously discussed. More specific recommendations are made concerning the selection of candidates and the post-training evaluation of ability. In connection with the latter problem, attention is invited to the need for a more direct exchange of information between the training activities and the operating fleets. A preliminary draft of a form is suggested for the gathering of information from the fleet relative to leadership ability demonstrated by graduates during the first ten months of their commissioned service.

CHAPTER I

Leadership - What Is It? What Does It Require?

Through the span of military history, methods of combat, means of transport, and tools of war have changed tremendously, but leadership, still the most important prerequisite to military success, has changed but little. The change which has occurred has resulted from the increased education of the mass of followers. This is important and cannot be overlooked by the successful leader. We believe that we know more about what constitutes good leadership than did our predecessors, though few would go so far as to say that we, in our enlightened age, have produced better leaders than those of the past. But it does seem reasonable to assert that by our planned training and development in recent years we have produced more leaders per capita, some of whom have led vastly larger organizations with eminent success.

Lead or Drive. - Leadership may be positive or negative. Negative leadership implies a dictatorial imposition of the leader's will by threat of punishment for failure to comply with requirements. Under such conditions the desired group activity results from obedience motivated by fear - and only so long as fear outweighs personal desires. In a strict sense the individual is not led but driven. Positive leadership, on the other hand, brings a voluntary identification of one's own desires with those of the leader and some degree of enthusiasm in the accomplishment of the tasks he sets. Under such conditions obedience is motivated by a common craving for success in

the achievement of a common goal. This promotes a maximum expenditure of energy by both leader and led and encourages the exercise of initiative in the search for the shortest safe route to the goal.

It is only this positive leadership that succeeds in the democratic society in which we live. Positive leadership has carried our successful military figures to the top and has brought our armed forces to victory in every major conflict in which they have been engaged. It is this type of leadership around which our naval and military tradition is built and which we must increasingly seek to develop in the young men who will, in the years to come, be responsible for our success or failure in any future conflict which may be forced upon us.

Leadership Defined. - There have been many attempts to embody in a single sentence a reasonably concise definition of leadership. Such efforts seem foredoomed to failure. In fact the leader per se does not exist. One person may exhibit outstanding ability in one situation while another assumes a leading role in a different situation. Therefore a definition must be couched rather in terms of the result produced, unsatisfactory as such an approach may be. The following definition is proposed:

Leadership is the exercise of qualities which, in a given situation, influence others to cooperate willingly in the accomplishment of a task which they have come to regard as mutually desirable and immediately important.

Types of Leadership. - The analysis of Lewin, Lippitt and White, based on the leader's behavior, distinguishes three types of

Types of Leadership

leadership: (1) authoritarian, (2) democratic, and (3) laissez-faire. They compare these types as follows:

<u>"Authoritarian"</u>	<u>Democratic</u>	<u>Laissez-faire</u>
1. All determination of policy by the leader.	1. All policies a matter of group discussion and decision, encouraged and assisted by the leader.	1. Complete freedom for group or individual decision, without any leader participation.
2. Techniques and activity steps dictated by the authority, one at a time, so that future steps were always uncertain to a large degree.	2. Activity perspective gained during first discussion period. General steps to group goal sketched, and where technical advice was needed the leader suggested two or three alternative procedures from which choice could be made.	2. Various materials supplied by the leader, who made it clear that he would supply information when asked. He took no other part in work discussions.
3. The leader usually dictated the particular work task and work companions of each member.	3. The members were free to work with whomever they chose, and the division of tasks was left up to the group.	3. Complete nonparticipation by the leader.
4. The dominator was "personal" in his praise and criticism of the work of each member, but remained aloof from active group participation except when demonstrating. He was friendly or impersonal rather than openly hostile.	4. The leader was "objective" or "fact minded" in his praise and criticism, and tried to be a regular group member in spirit without doing too much of the work.	4. Very infrequent comments on member activities unless questioned, and no attempt to participate or interfere with the course of events."

Based rather on the nature of the leader's clientele, leadership might also be classified as: (1) social, (2) political, and (3) military. Social leadership, since the group aims are usually

(1) Lewin, K., Lippitt, R. and White, R.K. "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created Social Climates." Journal of Social Psychology, Oct., 1939, pp. 271-299.

vague, tends to be of the laissez-faire. However, really successful and active social leadership fits very well into the democratic classification. The majority of our citizens actively engaged in the solution of social problems are fairly well informed as to the important facts basic to the solutions and have formed opinions or are ready to do so. Popular discussion and decision is therefore practicable. Goals and procedures in the situation evolve from the round-table discussion and debate. This is the essence of democratic procedure.

Political leadership often deals with problems upon which the ordinary citizen is less well informed and concerning which he is less interested in forming an opinion. The political leader, on the other hand, is, or should be well informed and usually has formed a definite opinion. It is his duty to bring this information to the attention of as many of his constituents as possible and to give them his opinion in any matter on which political action is needed. In urgent matters, when time will not permit of lengthy discussion, he will seek to win his constituents and his colleagues to his opinion. This type of leadership sometimes seems to depart somewhat from the democratic and to drift toward the authoritarian classification. This is not to suggest that our political leaders are not democratically representative. We elect them to political office because they hold general opinions which coincide with those of the majority of our people. It does indicate, however, that in certain types of situations it may not be practical to follow exactly the procedures of democratic leadership.

The political leader cannot, in each new situation, wait for public discussion and instructions from his constituents as to the course they wish him to pursue.

Our military leaders find it even less practical to consult the rank and file in each new situation. There are many minor problems which can be attacked in accordance with democratic decisions. However, a great many of the military tasks encountered are too technical to permit of fruitful discussion. In time of war, much of the information upon which decisions are based is confidential and hence known only to the leaders whose task it is to make the decisions and formulate the plans. Whenever possible those assigned to carry out these plans should be given a full understanding as to how and why they must be carried out. However, this cannot always be done. Thus military leadership is perforce more frequently of the authoritarian type.

Psychology in the Study and Practice of Leadership

Psychology the Basis. - Psychology, according to Warren, is "the scientific investigation of behavior of organisms". There have been many such short definitions of psychology proposed. In fact, the number of definitions almost equals the number of recognized authorities and no single one sentence definition has received outstanding approval. However, as pointed out by Philip L. Harriman, the chief point of agreement in all the definitions proposed is that psychology is an empirical science dealing with mental activities and objective behavior. In other words, it is through the science of psychology

that we hope, by study, to come to an understanding of behavior such as will enable us to predict and control it under variable conditions. Through the study of stimuli and their resultant responses we hope to reorganize our thinking in such a way as to be able to predict and control the behavior of ourselves and of others.

It follows then that an understanding and practical application of psychological principles and techniques is essential to the successful solution of problems dealing with the relation between leader and follower, between leaders, and among followers as well as those relating to the adaptation of the individual to the ever changing environment in which he finds himself.

Personality and Leadership. - Psychology had its beginning in the philosophy of the Greeks and Romans but began its rapid growth, as the science we know today, only about 60 years ago. The psychological study of personality and leadership sped up during and after World War I with the realization of the importance of selecting and training, in a tremendously accelerated program, individuals who could rally their followers to a common cause and bring about a maximum cooperative effort in situations of great emotional strain. Some progress has been made. Much has been written and a considerable amount of data has been made available. The principal difficulty in determining what factors make for good leadership arises out of the fact that since leadership is a relation which exists between persons in a social situation, those who lead in one situation may not necessarily be leaders in other situations. Stogdill points out that "the very studies which

provide the strongest arguments for the situational nature of leadership also provide the strongest evidence indicating that leadership patterns as well as non-leadership patterns of behavior are persistent and relatively stable." (1) Thus by the development of such patterns of behavior we are attempting to evolve measuring instruments by which we may determine which individuals show promise of demonstrating leadership under various types of situations.

In our highly organized society the necessity for good leadership is of utmost importance and therefore the need for proven methods of selecting and training for leadership is a most pressing one. There is need for a reliable measuring device by the use of which we can judge ability to lead others in typical situations. Its discovery would mark one of the greatest advances our civilization has ever known. We need also to know what factors of leadership are weakest in an individual and how to strengthen them. However, the findings of Jennings (2) and Newstetter (3) suggest that the selection of leaders should be less difficult than training non-leaders to become leaders.

Psychology in Military Leadership. - Pennington, Hough and Case, in their treatment of military leadership, liken the leader to a "human engineer" who "makes use of the facts and rules-of-action established by psychology in the sound and adequate handling of the men of

(1) Stogdill, Ralph M. "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature". Journal of Psychology, 1948, V.25, p.65.

(2) Jennings, E.H. Leadership and Isolation. New York: Longmans Green, 1943.

(3) Newstetter, W.I., Feldstein, M.J., Newcomb, T.M. Group Adjustment: A Study in Experimental Sociology. Cleveland: Western Reserve University, 1938.

his command. Military Psychology", they continue, "is thus one of the many branches of that broad and general profession designated as human engineering." (1)

The German Army, undemocratic as it was, recognized the tremendous importance of this so-called "human engineering". The German High Command defined total war as "the combined use of military, economic and psychological tactics". (2) These psychological tactics were undoubtedly intended as effective measures to be used not only against the enemy but also with the troops of their own army and with German civilians.

Military Problems. - In military leadership, particularly in the accelerated programs of war time expansion, selecting and training are further complicated by the need for rapid adjustment of personnel to a new environment of strict discipline and regular routine in an organization made up of individuals whose personalities, abilities and capabilities vary greatly. Obviously, the problem of training and leadership development may be greatly facilitated by a valid system of selection. In the selection process, due consideration must be given to any evidence of demonstrated leadership and the possibility of the transfer of such ability, even though the military situations, especially in combat, may be very different from those of peacetime civilian experience.

(1) Pennington, L. A., Mough, Lt. Col., U.S.A., Case, H.W. The Psychology of Military Leadership. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943, p. 1.

(2) Pratt, C.C. Psychology - The Third Dimension of War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. 3-29.

Adjustment. - Wartime training requires the concentrated attention of instructor and student. Emotional distractions resulting from maladjustment cause mental blocks which impede planned learning and foster incidental learning of a detrimental nature. Such rapid adjustment to military life requires personnel who are capable of readily reorganizing their habits, attitudes and thinking to fit a new situation. During early training when a recruit moves rapidly from one unit to another his environment is continually changing and, with minimum experience, he is called upon constantly to readjust himself.

Efficiency of the individual within his organization depends, to a great extent, upon his personal adjustment. This problem of adjustment may be more difficult for some than for others. Some are able to adapt themselves speedily. Some have a greater desire to adapt themselves. Some are younger, less experienced and more dependent on paternalistic guidance. Unfortunately some will slip through the screening process who are totally, or largely unable to make the adjustment. That is to say that the habits by which they formerly satisfied their wants are so persistent that they are unable to unlearn these habits and to learn new ones. This maladjustment is the cause of inefficiency, low morale and problems of discipline.

In this problem of adjustment, every leader, regardless of the level of his operations, must be able: (1) to get along well with his superiors, (2) to work well with persons of his own or subordinate levels, (3) to recognize and alleviate the difficulties of adjustment

in others, and (4) to recognize the man in whom a reasonably full readjustment is impossible. A knowledge of psychology, the study of human reaction and behavior, is therefore most important in the development of the successful leader. Major General Huebner says of psychology, "If we are forced to select our wartime officers quickly, the development of science of psychology may help; but I doubt that we will ever be able to look inside a man and determine his leadership fitness".⁽¹⁾ Though such an ability is more than we can expect, psychology will help us better to understand the problems of the individual and how best to help him cope with them and can contribute much to successful leadership.

Social Leadership

Leaders and Followers. - As Stogdill points out, "leadership is a relation that exists between persons in a social situation".⁽²⁾ Leaders in one situation are not necessarily leaders in another different situation. When the leader relinquishes his position to another he usually becomes a follower and as Ackerson reports, "the correlation for 'leader' and 'follower' are not of opposite sign and similar magnitude as would be expected of traits supposed to be antithetical. It may be that the true antithesis of 'leader' is not 'follower' but 'indifference', i.e., the incapacity or unwillingness either to lead or follow." ⁽³⁾

(1) Huebner, C.R., Maj. Gen., U.S.A. "Leadership in World War II". Coast Artillery Journal, V. 89, Nov.-Dec. 1946, p.43.

(2) Stogdill, op.cit. p. 65.

(3) Ackerson, L. Childrens Behavior Problems: Relative Importance and Intercorrelation Among Traits. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

Empirical Study of Traits. - Stogdill (supra), in a survey of some 124 writings which deal with studies to determine the traits and characteristics of leadership, reports that the five traits which are supported by uniformly positive evidence from 15 or more of the studies surveyed are:

- (1) Intelligence.
- (2) Scholarship.
- (3) Dependability in exercising responsibilities.
- (4) Activity and social participation.
- (5) Socio-economic status.

Ten more traits, positively supported by no less than 10 studies included:

- (1) Sociability.
- (2) Initiative.
- (3) Persistence.
- (4) Knowing how to get things done.
- (5) Self confidence.
- (6) Alertness to, and insight into situations.
- (7) Cooperativeness.
- (8) Popularity.
- (9) Adaptability.
- (10) Verbal facility.

It is enlightening to note the correlations of these traits with leadership criteria as reported in Stogdill's survey. It is well to understand that since no perfect criteria exist with which to compare factors of leadership, such correlations should be considered only as showing probable relationships. It also appears that most of the studies upon which these correlations are based mainly concerned students from the elementary level through college and hence in various stages of maturity. The criterion was, for the most part, leadership, as evidenced by activity in scholastic, social and possibly civil organizations.

Intelligence. - Twenty-three of the studies found evidence to indicate that intelligence is an important factor. Five studies found that intelligence makes no difference and a like number found that too great a difference between the intelligence of leader and followers militates against leadership. Correlations favoring intelligence as a factor ranged from $+0.06$ to $+0.90$ and averaged approximately $+0.28$. Significant findings led Hollingworth ⁽¹⁾ to conclude that a person whose IQ is considerably above that of the group stands little chance of being a popular leader of his group. One of the difficulties was felt to be that of communication. The writer is of the opinion, however, that this would be true only in areas of close association and that as the distance between the leader and follower increased the effect of the IQ difference would decrease. McCuen, ⁽²⁾ in his study of 58 college student organizations, found that there is a tendency to select, as leaders, those whose intelligence score is slightly above the average of the group. Maller ⁽³⁾ found that homogeneity of intelligence, rather than the level of intelligence, is an important factor in cooperative behavior.

Scholarship. - Twenty-two studies are reported to have shown a positive correlation between leadership and scholastic records. Only

(1) Hollingworth, L.S., Gifted Children, New York: MacMillan, 1926.

(2) McCuen, T.L. "Leadership and Intelligence". Education, 1929, V.50, pp.89-95.

(3) Maller, J. B. "Cooperation and Competition: An Experimental Study in Motivation". Teachers College Contractual Education, 1925, No. 384.

one found a negative correlation and four found no difference. This suggests that scholarship may have a favorable influence in that it indicates a general ability to get things done. It also suggests that superior accomplishment along lines in which the group is interested carries a prestige value which may contribute toward leadership status. It is interesting to note, however, that the positive correlations ranged only from $+.05$ to $+.39$.

Judgment and Decision. - There were five studies which found evidence that soundness and finality of judgment contribute appreciably with correlations ranging from $+.28$ to $+.69$. Cowley ⁽¹⁾ claims to have found three factors which appear to represent speed of decision. Hanawalt, Richardson and Hamilton ⁽²⁾ find that leaders tend to mark the "undecided" response on the Bernreuter test with considerably less frequency than non-leaders and that this tendency is especially noticeable on the most differentiating items.

Insight. - Stogdill's survey reports that most competent investigators have reported evidence that insight and awareness are factors associated with leadership. This is an awareness of environment and ability to evaluate situations. Social insight seems to be the least clearly defined and is in need of further investigation.

(1) Cowley, M.H. "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders". Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology, 1928, v.23, pp.144-157.

(2) Hanawalt, M.G., Richardson, H.M., Hamilton, R.J. "Leadership as Related to Bernreuter Personality Measures: II. An Item Analysis of Responses of College Leaders and Non-leaders". Journal of Social Psychology, 1943, v. 17, pp. 251-267.

Jennings (1) suggests that insight may be socially conditioned to a high degree.

Originality. - Only seven investigators found originality to be related to leadership but, with correlations from $+ .38$ to $+ .70$, this trait appears to have considerable weight and to be worthy of further investigation.

Initiative, Persistence and Ambition. - Many investigators found initiative, persistence and ambition to have a positive influence on leadership. They were reported to correlate as follows:

<u>Trait</u>	<u>Studies</u>	<u>Correlation</u>	
		<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Initiative, willingness to accept responsibility.	12	$+ .16$	$+ .56$
Persistence in the face of obstacles.	12	$+ .23$	$+ .70$
Ambition, desire to excel.	7	$+ .29$	$+ .64$
Application and industry.	5	$+ .16$	$+ .55$

Responsibility. - Evidence of responsibility as a factor in leadership was found by seventeen authorities with correlations ranging from $+ .10$ to $+ .57$.

Self-Confidence. - The factor described as "self assurance" in eleven studies and as "absence of modesty" in six studies correlated from $+ .12$ to $+ .59$. Only two studies found no differentiation between leaders and non-leaders in this trait.

Emotional Control. - In eleven studies, leaders were found to be more stable and emotionally controlled than their followers, correlations varying from $+ .16$ to $+ .70$, while five studies found leaders to be less well controlled, correlations running as high as $- .36$.

(1) Jennings, op.cit.

Three investigators found no differentiation.

Social and Economic Status. - Leaders come from higher socio-economic background according to the indications in fifteen studies, although the differences in social and socio-economic status between leaders and non-leaders are not extreme. Two studies reported that these differences in status are negligible.

Social Activity and Mobility. - As might be expected, social activity was found to be quite evident in many studies. It was found in twenty-five studies with correlations running as high as $+0.65$.

Popularity, Prestige. - Popularity is another trait which, as might be expected, is frequently found. In ten studies it was reported to correlate from $+0.32$ to $+0.82$. The heavy weighting of this factor may be accounted for somewhat in the fact that most of these studies concerned children of and below high school age.

Cooperation. - Cooperativeness, corporate responsibility and ability to enlist cooperation were found, in thirty one studies to contribute directly to leadership ability. The correlations in all cases were high, ranging from $+0.44$ to $+0.69$.

Fluency of Speech. - When one realizes the importance of a system of intercommunication in effective leadership, it is not surprising that in thirteen of these studies a close connection should be found between leadership and fluency of speech. Correlations ran from -0.11 in one study to $+0.61$ in another. Among highly paid administrators Thurstone ⁽¹⁾ found linguistic ability rather than word fluency

(1) Thurstone, L.L. A Factorial Study of Perception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944.

to differentiate the leader. Tone of voice was found to be less of a factor than linguistic ability.

Evidence in support of the characteristic of extroversion brought out in these studies was surprisingly weak. There were diverse findings regarding this attribute and, in the opinion of Stogdill, it appears to be very doubtful that leaders can be described with any degree of uniformity in terms of introversion or extroversion.

Although considerable negative evidence is reported, there seems to be generally a low positive correlation between leadership and such variables as chronological age, height, weight, physique, energy, appearance and dominance.

Thus it appears, from current empirical studies, that leadership results from a working relationship among members of a group and that the leader acquires status in a particular situation through active participation and by demonstration of capacity to enlist cooperation and to guide the efforts of his followers to a successful completion of the task at hand.

Military Leadership.

Empirical Study Needed. - At present there are few empirical data upon which to base conclusions as to what factors contribute most to successful military leadership. There are, however, numerous writings, and the opinions expressed are not without agreement. But, to date, few scientific studies have been conducted with the expressed purpose of determining the relative importance or weight which should be attached to the various qualities which many agree distinguish the

successful military leader. It is hoped that this discussion may result in a program of research which will aid us in selecting those capable of development into positive leaders and in eliminating those whose efforts to attain the status of military leadership are largely wasted and result in disappointment to the individual and to the public.

The opinions that follow are based on the writer's personal experience and observation. Numerous expressions of opinion have been studied and experience and self study have been tested by psychological theories. The resulting conclusions are intended for consideration and criticism by those who would join in the attempt to determine why some individuals are more successful than others in accomplishing assigned missions with minimum waste and discord.

Basic Qualities. - Study and experience lead the writer to suggest that successful leadership in any situation depends upon (1) a comprehensive understanding of human behavior, (2) ability to exercise good judgment, and (3) broad experience and ability to profit therefrom. The many traits which distinguish military leaders may well be grouped under these three main qualities to which they contribute, in varying degree, under different situations.

Understanding Human Behavior. - Success in any field, apart from pure chance, first requires an understanding of that with which one deals. A successful leader must deal with, and hence must understand human beings. No two people are alike so their reactions to the same situation are likely to differ. Situations vary over a

wide range. Therefore, to predict human reactions under varying situations becomes an exceedingly complex problem. However, when, from a superior understanding of human behavior, one is able to predict, with some degree of accuracy, the general reaction to a given situation or when by his own activity, one is able to bring about a desired reaction, his chances of attaining status as a leader have been greatly improved. Leaders attempt to gain and maintain control of a group by (1) controlling the situation, (2) conditioning the individuals of the group to react favorably to expected situations or (3) by countering, with well laid plans, an expected adverse reaction. There are several traits which seem to contribute directly to this ability to predict and control human behavior. There are:

Sympathy	Courage
Tact	Truthfulness
Justice	Moral Courage
Honor	Simplicity
Loyalty	

SYMPATHY is the foundation of understanding in any human relation. It enables one to see the situation from the other fellow's point of view, to understand his feelings and to predict his behavior. Sympathy is a desire to put one's self in the place of another and to share his feelings. It may well result in a mutual exchange of views which, in turn, results in understanding and agreement. Thus sympathy is an influence which the leader may not neglect.

TACT implies a delicate and sympathetic perception, especially of what is fitting or considerate. It is the desirable result of sympathetic understanding. The exercise of tact is most essential in positive leadership, especially among democratic people. It is one

means by which the leader may demonstrate his understanding and sympathy. The tactful leader thinks twice before speaking or acting lest he unnecessarily and unintentionally offend another.

A sense of JUSTICE is another trait by which a leader may demonstrate his human understanding. Administration of justice implies that there has been a conflict between the ideas or conduct of some individual and the accepted norm. Therefore, a proper settlement requires a changing of ideas or attitudes in order to preclude further conflict and to redirect all efforts toward the accepted common goal. In order completely to redirect the efforts of one whose attitude and actions have deviated from the proper course it is necessary that he believe that understanding and fairness have actuated his correction and that partiality or tyranny have had no part in it. One being corrected is usually in a critical state of mind and may be somewhat blinded by emotion. It is, therefore, particularly important that he be given a picture of the situation as it should appear and that he be convinced of the fairness of the decision. A few minutes spent in kindly explanation, when punishment is awarded, will not only make the action more effective but will also enhance the regard for the leader who will take the time and interest to do it.

HONOR is based on respect and esteem. It connotes a nice sense of what is just and right. It implies that one has made an honest and critical evaluation of one's self. Honor does not permit any controllable action which would result in a lowered self-respect. On the contrary, honor dictates action which raises the esteem with which one is regarded by one's self or by others. Pride without honor

is false. The golden rule is a practical interpretation of honor. As Shakespeare so aptly put it, "This above all; to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."

LOYALTY does not imply homage. In our modern and democratic concept of leadership, loyalty connotes rather a feeling of sentiment, often strong and even enthusiastic, accompanying allegiance. Thus we speak of loyalty to the leader, loyalty to the follower, the group or organization, and loyalty to the cause. Loyalty between individuals is a feeling of responsibility one for the other. It cannot be viewed as a one way proposition. Loyalty begets loyalty. It is a mutual and progressive feeling without which no organization can long endure. Disloyalty is a malignant infection which spells doom for any cause or organization in which it is permitted to exist. More often than not, it begins with a lack of consideration by the leader for those led and ends either in complete disaster for all or the downfall of the leader and his replacement by one who has a better understanding of human feelings and behavior. The military leader who knows that his men "will do anything for him" has confidence in their loyalty. This situation can result only from the fact that his men have confidence that they are his first concern and that he will look out for them, come what may.

COURAGE is the ability to overcome fear. Fear is a state of mind which exists in every being under certain conditions. One who is courageous has the will to overcome that feeling of fear. He replaces it with an intensity of purpose which will drive him on, in the face of danger, to the accomplishment of a task which he believes will contribute toward the achievement of an ultimate goal. Courage is not

an innate characteristic; it must be developed. In the leader it is important because of its inspirational value. Leadership is the act of going ahead and, by inspirational example, drawing one's followers along toward the goal. Courage as exemplified in the leader engenders courage in the follower and promotes a fuller devotion of energy to the purpose at hand. It is no disgrace to experience fear or to admit it. The leader overcomes this fear by sheer will power, the follower may need a little help.

TRUTHFULNESS is the foundation upon which trust is built. No leader can be successful without the complete confidence of his followers, nor will he, without trust, as a subordinate leader, follow a superior leader with full devotion. Trust cannot long endure without integrity; nor can its lack long be concealed. The truth seems to have a way of leaking out and when there is evidence that the leader is seeking to cover up or deceive, trust begins to wane, followers begin to doubt and the influence of the leader begins a definite decline. A real leader never lets a promise go unfulfilled, he doesn't evade responsibility by an untruth or even by a statement which may mislead. He doesn't seek to cover up his ignorance by a false front, he doesn't "pass the buck" for his mistakes to someone else. In short, he can be relied upon and trusted. His men "know where they stand" and they are eager to help him succeed in anything he undertakes.

Good Judgment. - The second of the basic qualities upon which military leadership is built, is the ability to decide upon that course of action which is most likely to bring success. Due to the increased

tempo of our civilization, particularly in the military profession, it may frequently be necessary to reach decisions quickly. This does not mean that snap judgment is to be practiced, but rather that the leader must be trained to think quickly. He must be able to decide, with confidence and without delay, the best course of action under the existing circumstances.

Those attributes which, to the writer, appear to facilitate the exercise of good judgment are:

- Intelligence
- Acumen
- Professional Knowledge
- Self-confidence
- Willingness to accept responsibility
- Emotional Control

INTELLIGENCE is an important basic factor. There have been many attempts to define intelligence. In general they stress adaptability to changing situations and ability to learn from experience. It would seem obvious that intelligence is a controlling factor in the development of all of the attributes listed above. The situations with which the military leader of today is faced are rapidly growing more complex. To make a proper appraisal of the rapidly changing modern picture requires an increasingly alert and agile mind and an ability to change one's plans in minimum time. To assimilate the knowledge and understanding of the increasingly complex processes and techniques in the manufacture and use of modern equipment, taxes the intelligence of the modern military leader beyond all previous bounds. Intelligence is largely an innate factor, capable of development only to a very limited degree. Therefore we must find, as

candidates for positions of leadership, those individuals with the level of intelligence which will permit them to cope with the problems of a rapidly changing and complex world.

ACUMEN is the ability to perceive, discern, discriminate and deduce. Its possession is required in any person who must analyze a situation and reach a decision. This we refer to in naval parlance as "making an estimate of the situation". The leader is lost who, having the facts, is not able to analyze them, to visualize the various solutions which are feasible and to choose a course of action which will produce satisfactory results. Such a plan must also cover any possible change of the situation which may occur before the action is completed.

PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE is necessary to success at any level. Leaders must have the confidence of their followers. Such confidence is inspired, in no small way, by their possession and use of superior knowledge of techniques. Junior officers spend a great deal of their time in the instruction of their men. The men are most discerning in their appraisal of the instructor's knowledge and ability. If they are not up to high standards, the men will have little interest in and less respect for, what he has to say. It is not only necessary that the leader possess this professional knowledge but also that he be able to pass it on to others in such a way that it will be fully and clearly understood. Thus the leader must be simultaneously, an apt student and an able teacher. Linguistic ability will contribute much to the leader's success as a teacher. Proper instruction always includes an evaluation of student understanding and progress. How can

the student accept such an appraisal as fair if he has no faith in the understanding of the instructor? An "estimate of the situation" must be based on a complete understanding of the technical possibilities. Therefore the leader must have a ready store of professional knowledge in order to reach a decision and to set up a plan of action which is efficient and practical. There are too many sad examples of unsuccessful attempts by those who lack the necessary background of professional knowledge to prescribe plans of action. Repeated failures soon destroy confidence in the leader. In politics, such a leader is replaced at the next election. The military leader is relieved of his command. But in each case replacement occurs only after a loss has been sustained. In military leadership such losses are particularly important because they may be represented by the lives of many loyal men. Improvement of professional knowledge is a continuing process. For the professional leader school is never over.

SELF-CONFIDENCE is perhaps one of the two factors most commonly lacking in non-leaders. Confidence implies faith. The leader needs three kinds of faith; faith in a cause, faith in mankind and faith in one's self. ⁽¹⁾ It is an often heard truism that "nothing breeds success like success". It might as truly be said that nothing breeds confidence like success and that success is often dependent upon confidence. Also, like success, confidence begets confidence and is contagious. Confidence is transferable to others and is, therefore,

(1) Griffiths, W., Cdr. U.S.N. Talks on Leadership. Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval General Line School, 1947, p. 38.

highly desirable in a leader. Confidence or faith in one's self is, perhaps, more difficult to transfer than faith in a cause or in fellow men. But no individual will have the nerve to make important decisions and to follow them through unless he has all three kinds of faith. He must have faith that his cause is right and that his plan of action is best. He must be confident that his followers will likewise have faith in the cause, in their leader's judgment and in themselves, if they are to strive vigorously toward the successful accomplishment of the mission.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY is a mark of self-confidence. The lack of it indicates a lack of moral courage. It is unfortunate that the fear of blame for failure stifles initiative and willingness to accept responsibility among military men, especially younger leaders. It is not surprising, however, that such fear should exist in a highly competitive career where too often one misstep or serious failure may spell ruin insofar as advancement is concerned. However, much can be done to strengthen this weakness by encouraging one's subordinates to show initiative and to accept, or even seek out, responsibility. They should know that an occasional mistake may be regarded as natural but that there is little excuse for continued repetition. The stature of the leader grows tremendously, in the eyes of the follower, when it is evident that he is willing to accept full responsibility for failures and to share credit for success. One thing which a popular and successful leader never does

is to "pass the buck". He considers well his plan of action, proceeds with confidence and, if it fails, is a man, "owns up" and resolves to profit by his mistake.

EMOTIONAL CONTROL on the part of the leader may be said to have contributed much to the success of many activities which have been carried on under circumstances of great nervous strain. According to English, "emoting is a complex tangle of personal activity".⁽¹⁾ He explains the component parts of this complex behavior as (1) perceiving or imagining the emotive situation, (2) doing something to alter or control the emotive situation, (3) making a muscular and glandular internal adaptation, (4) making an expressive movement, (5) making a verbal expression and, perhaps, (6) a secondary naming of the emotional feeling. Those components which would seem to be most controllable and which would seem to have the most effect on others are those which English refers to as the 2nd., 4th., 5th., and 6th. components. The expression of one person's emotion points out to another the existence of the emotional situation. This passing of feeling from one person to another may easily set up a sort of chain reaction which, in some cases, may result in mass hysteria, a powerful and often uncontrollable force. The leader may be called upon either to prevent such a reaction by a concealment of his inner feeling or to bring it about by a moving expression of emotion. Hence he must be ready and

(1) English, H.B., "What is Emotion". The Ohio Journal of Science, Mar. 1946, pp. 62-66.

able to conceal or express his inner feelings as the situation may demand. In short he must have full control of his outward appearance. A leader cannot hope to control the emotions of his followers until he has first mastered control of his own expression. Thus the ability of the leader to appear "calm and collected", regardless of his inner feeling or to arouse emotional activity in his followers at an appropriate time is an invaluable asset to any person who would aspire to military leadership. True, we have had many great leaders who seemed to lack that control of emotion or temper, but greater control of their emotional expression would have brought them even greater success. Such lack of control more often however results in failure in dealing with one's associates, be they superior or subordinate.

Experience. - We are all of equal experience at birth. The extent to which our experience develops advantageously is dependent largely upon the environment in which we live. For one individual, experience may be characterized by a lack of variety or spread; life may be routine. For another, life may supply a broad variety of experience. Intelligence determines how much one profits by his experience. Experience is the conditioner, the background for judgment and understanding and hence may be considered to be the most essential of our three main qualities. The intelligent individual of wide experience may be considered as a likely possibility in our search for leaders. It seems to the writer that the traits which contribute most to the broad experience needed in a leader are:

Ambition
Assiduity
Initiative

AMBITION is a developed trait, often dependent upon environment. Although statistics suggest that leaders tend to come from that group whose socio-economic background is superior to that of the average of their followers, ⁽¹⁾ there have been many leaders in history whose early socio-economic status was considerably below the general average. Their success was largely due to an ambition to better their own status and that of their fellows. Here ambition developed in spite of a lowly status and probably because of environment. Ambition is a desire to succeed. True, the goal may not always be commendable, but in any case it is the ambition that provides the drive. A successful leader must be a dynamic individual and ambition is the control valve for his energy. Experience is largely dependent upon ambition since ambition controls action and experience, or the variety of it, has its source in action.

ASSIDUITY is closely related to energy and perseverance. It is certainly a most necessary attribute for the military leader. It means hard work and diligent application. Success comes only from unceasing effort and constant study. Assiduity implies not only physical effort, but constant mental action, foresight, planning for emergencies, and review of plans of action in order to be ready to act when the need arises. What must be done if a man falls overboard, a

(1) Stogdill, op.cit. p. 56

fire is discovered, a submarine or hostile aircraft is contacted or a casualty suddenly catapults one into a position of greatly increased responsibility? - Will he be ready? Not unless he has had the foresight and conscientiousness to prepare himself. The possibility of such an emergency may seem remote but, when it occurs, there is little time to organize and prepare amid the natural confusion. Lack of preparation will only add to that confusion. Assiduity, then, implies an energetic and conscientious effort to prepare and a diligent application and perseverance in the execution of plans of action when the time comes. It provides a great opportunity for experience and enables one more surely to profit from his experience.

INITIATIVE also leads to greater experience through increased action. It is unfortunate that, like willingness to accept responsibility, initiative is often held in check by fear of blame. Initiative is a trait too often lacking in our young leaders. In many young officers it is the hardest to develop. At the same time it is, if accompanied by a sense of responsibility, the trait most outstanding in those who exercise it. The young man who, with considered judgment and responsibility, can be relied upon to go ahead and do things without waiting to be told, is bound to attract favorable attention from his superiors. The responsibility and authority with which he is vested will increase rapidly. Initiative and foresight in providing for the needs of one's followers is deeply appreciated and justifies their faith in the leader.

CHAPTER II

The Naval Leader

The successful naval officer accomplishes all assigned missions and in the most efficient manner. To so succeed he must enlist the enthusiastic cooperation of all concerned. This is a big order. Such a goal aims at perfection, but success has never been easy and, though perfection may never be attained, it makes a good target.

The Objective. - Accomplishment is the objective. It must be pursued with all the energy and determination one can muster. It may be assumed that the ultimate accomplishment of a task is taken for granted by the superior who makes the assignment. In his decision to assign a given task, a good leader will consider the difficulties involved, the forces available and the ability of the subordinate leader to whom the assignment is made.

On first inspection, a task may seem, to the assignee, like an impossible one. But competent leaders realize that "impossible" jobs are reserved especially for them and that the accomplishment is not, in the mind of the superior, a question of "whether or not" but only a question of "how soon". The longer one ponders the methods and means of accomplishing the difficult task, the less difficult it appears to be. The question of "how" becomes rather a question of "how completely, how efficiently and how expeditiously" it may be accomplished.

Preparation. - The whole-hearted cooperation that can be brought into play and the ability of those to whom the job is entrusted will indicate the answers to all three parts of this question.

Their ability depends upon the foresight and the training that has gone into their preparation. If the training has been neglected and they are ill-prepared, the job becomes immeasurably more difficult and may result in failure. It is usually too late to start training after an assignment has been received. Thus it is necessary to undergo many hours of tiresome training long before reaching the field of action. We train for hours, days, weeks, months, yes even years, to be ready when the orders are received, instantly to proceed with confidence on any mission to which we may be assigned.

Enthusiastic Cooperation. - Cooperation makes the job much easier and more pleasant, if any job, especially in wartime, may be considered pleasant. At least it is less unpleasant, and no one will deny that the experience of full cooperation and harmony in a difficult task is indeed thrilling.

Full cooperation is usually accompanied by enthusiasm, if only to speed the completion of an unpleasant task. This enthusiastic cooperation is an indication of high morale and good leadership. As ability results from long hard periods of training, so enthusiasm and high morale result from long and careful planning and patient application of effort on the part of the leaders. Unlike ability, however, high morale and enthusiasm can be lost almost overnight. Like an explosive, it may take a long time to make but once made it must be handled with care. One careless slip may prove disastrous.

Building a Cooperative Attitude. - This leadership that can build up enthusiasm and develop a feeling which may be relied upon to

foster cooperation is no secret; but thought, consideration, careful planning and constant attention are required. In the first place, cooperation requires an understanding of the objective. It is foolish to expect cooperation from people who do not understand what they are trying to do. Time spent in a simple explanation of purpose will be saved, many times over, in the execution of the plans if all understand the objective well enough to work cooperatively. In the second place, each person must be fully aware of the limitations of his own authority and responsibility. Lack of knowledge or disregard of these limits, probably is responsible for more non-cooperation and bickering than anything else. It is the duty of the leader to define these limits definitely and to assure himself that all are aware of their full meaning. In the third place, each individual must be able to perform his own duties with maximum efficiency and confidence. Finally, a comprehensive knowledge of the duties and difficulties of one's colleagues fosters a cooperative spirit. It is a common failing to exaggerate one's own difficulties and to underestimate those of another. An example of the attempt to educate leaders in this important factor may be found in the "position rotation plan" of modern industry and the "interdepartmental rotation plan" used in training junior officers.

Enthusiasm results from (1) personal interest, (2) understanding of objectives and (3) a sense of being a part of a highly cooperative team. Interest usually is already present, though it may need some awakening from its latent state. If we take time to be sure

everyone knows just what we are trying to do and, by example and patient effort, build up the cooperative "we" spirit, there need be no worry about enthusiasm. - But one must be generous with deserved praise and judicious in constructive criticism, lest the work of months in building team spirit and morale be undone in a matter of hours.

Efficiency. - Efficiency is secondary to accomplishment but nevertheless is important. By efficiency is meant accomplishment of an objective with the least possible expenditure of money, materials, effort and time. It may not be practical to conserve all four of these assets, hence a practical balance must be struck. What constitutes a balance will depend upon the situation. The decision must rest with the leader who must estimate the situation and exercise his judgment. An understanding of the objective, of the urgency of the accomplishment and of the probabilities of the future, all play a part in his decision. For example, it would be highly inefficient to expend ammunition on an enemy torpedo plane that has already launched its torpedo and is retiring when other planes are commencing their attack run.

Orders and Initiative. - Leaders can do much to increase cooperation and efficiency by the way in which they formulate their orders. In the first place, orders must be clear and concise. They should be complete, but only in such detail as will assure a full realization of the objective. Orders should allow for the maximum

exercise of initiative. When a leader has confidence that a subordinate is fully informed he should indicate the objective in clear and concise terms and leave the details of the operation to the subordinate. Too often a statement of the objective is so beclouded by details of procedure that the primary meaning is completely hidden. It is not uncommon to hear a Junior Officer-of-the-Watch direct a ship's boat coxswain to proceed to a certain landing and return to the ship, and then to follow these orders with much detailed advice as to what procedure to follow under certain circumstances which are not likely to arise. When the young officer finally runs out of advice, the coxswain usually replies, "Aye, Aye Sir, - but where was it you wanted me to go?" Details require time and attention which the leader can ill afford to give without slighting something more important on which he should be concentrating. With no opportunity to display initiative, one can never build in himself, or in his superior, confidence in his ability to act independently.

But what about the junior officer or the enlisted man who is one of the bottom links in the chain of command? Does not this hierarchy of military organization impose completely stifling restrictions upon his exercise of judgment, initiative and leadership? There are restrictions, no doubt; but for the most part, these are restrictions which result from lack of experience, knowledge and information on the part of the subordinate in comparison with his seniors. Many of the restrictions thus imposed prevent an inexperienced individual from wasting time on "new ideas" which often have

been tried and discarded by someone before him. Does this then mean that ideas move only down the military chain of command? Not at all! All must realize that the chain of command is a two way street. To the junior, whose ideas and suggestions have to go up hill, it may seem that his side of the street is narrow and rough. But it is nevertheless navigable if one proceeds carefully and does not try to take short cuts. No subordinate should fail to make suggestions to his superior after he has considered them carefully himself. They should be passed up the line of responsibility, and at each stage, should be properly received and carefully considered. At each stage the passer must assume responsibility for his own endorsement or expressed opinion, but at no stage along the line may the passer rightfully assume credit for origination of the idea. When a superior accepts a suggestion he must likewise pass credit back down to the level from whence the suggestion originated and must assure himself that it reaches the individual properly entitled to it. The military organization structure promotes conservatism in that radical ideas are subjected to careful consideration, modification or even rejection. It provides opportunity for the development of loyalty and the ability to get along with others even when ideas and opinions differ. At the same time, ideas, suggestions and opinions carefully considered and tactfully presented may move up or down the line of responsibility with credit or explanation returning eventually to the originator.

Relation of the Part to the Whole. - Whenever possible, the

leader should make clear to the subordinate, the association of his assigned task to the ultimate mission or goal. Such information gives the subordinate a sense of worthwhile accomplishment from the completion of what would be otherwise a dissociated and seemingly unimportant contribution. Not only does such consideration by the leader lend importance to the efforts of the subordinate but it gives perspective to his view of the whole picture and increases the understanding with which he will perform his duties. This subordinate understanding of the whole problem may also result in some excellent and unthought-of ideas or suggestions. Many valuable ideas were received from workers in our wartime industries because management was thoughtful enough to explain the problem beyond the edge of the worker's bench. Solutions may be much more evident from another fellow's perspective.

Prediction and Control. - An understanding of the human reactions to be expected from known stimuli is absolutely essential to successful leadership. Likewise it is necessary that a leader be able to recognize the stimuli which a known situation will create or how to alter the situation in order to produce the stimuli appropriate to the desired reaction. However, the prediction of human behavior is not an exact science. One cannot memorize rules of stimulus versus reaction and expect to apply them with consistent success. The problem of controlling human reactions is vastly more complicated and certainly more interesting because of the many variables involved. The greatest of these variables arises out of the individual differences among human beings. However, with a

background of psychological understanding as to the most likely response, one is much better fitted to exercise control. Hence, in teaching leadership we must strengthen this psychological understanding and impress upon the student the necessity of studying the individual characteristics of those whom he would lead. To the junior officer this means knowing everything that is humanly possible about his men. The better he knows them the better he will be able to understand them and to lead them. Another aid to prediction is uniformity of training. Three important principles of this uniform training are: first the basic training must rest on a sound foundation, secondly, policies, doctrines and procedures must be similar and they must be well known and understood, and finally, association, familiarity and joint training enable one individual or unit to predict the action to be expected of another. The successful joint operations of the Navy and Marine Corps and of the Army Ground Forces and Air Force during the recent war resulted from such uniformity of training and previous joint training operations. The joint operations of the Army and the Navy and of armies and navies of different allied powers, while demonstrating a certain degree of cooperation, were not smooth until differences in procedure were adjusted and mutual familiarity was increased by continued association in joint combat operations.

The "Born Leader". - It is common but improper to refer to a person as a "born leader". This implies that an individual may inherit the qualities which are required of a successful leader. Such

a heritage is obviously impossible. However, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that intelligence is largely hereditary. It seems logical that heredity may have much to do with the qualities of acumen, assiduity and emotional control. It is not improbable that other traits are also influenced by heredity. On the other hand, it would seem entirely proper to say that many of the asserted qualities of a leader, if not all of them, are influenced by his environment including, besides his immediate family, his school, church and companions. Most of the traits which seem to make the greatest contributions to the quality of leadership are acquired and developed traits. This development starts at a very tender age and the influence exerted by the family after the birth of the child is indirect and developmental rather than hereditary. Therefore, if by "born leader", one refers to an individual who has the good fortune to be the offspring of intelligent parents who realize the importance of developing those traits which make for leadership and who pursue a well thought out training program, the term is not without validity. David Dixon Porter, Oliver Hazard Perry and David Glasgow Farragut were reared in good families and thus are excellent examples of this interpretation of a "born leader". Farragut was adopted at the age of nine by Capt. David Porter, the father of Admiral Porter.

The environmental factor is all-important at any stage of leadership development, but is particularly so during the years of parental training. A child who grows up in close association with a successful parent or sibling is not necessarily in the best environ-

ment for the development of leadership traits. As a matter of fact, it might be better to say that some have grown up in the "shadow of success". When the greatness of the parent overshadows the child the result is indeed unfortunate. Personal experience indicates that those traits which seem to suffer most under such an environment are the very important and closely associated factors of self confidence, initiative and willingness to accept responsibility. Assiduity and moral courage are also often affected. The writer has known the sons of several notably successful leaders who seem to have either a definitely negative or an obstreperous personality. They have been overshadowed for so long by a domineering parent that personal frustration has led them to one personality extreme or the other. Likewise the constant and almost inevitable comparison of one child with a competing sibling usually has a detrimental effect on personality development. The common error of parents in fostering a competitive spirit between their children may bring about effects which the parent neither expected nor intended. Baker and Traphagen state, "Most cases of bad temper develop before school age. They are bred by competition in the family life where siblings vie with one another for parental recognition".⁽¹⁾ According to Jersild,⁽²⁾ children who have developed emotional tensions as a result of sibling

(1) Baker, E.J. and Traphagen, V. The Diagnosis and Treatment of Behavior-Problem Children. New York: Macmillan 1935, p. 227.

(2) Jersild, A.Z. Child Psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945, p. 194.

rivalry frequently lose their stride in activities and fail to acquire skills which they actually could master. They react in ways that are not particularly advantageous to their development. For instance, they may exhibit timidity and fears where other children are well at ease; or they may seek the companionship of younger and less stimulating companions whom they can dominate. Thus it is obvious that the success of his closest associates in early life may impose a handicap upon a child rather than foster the growth of those traits necessary to later success.

It is not intended to infer that an environment of success is always a definite handicap. The parent who is a successful leader should well know what qualities are required. Most parents and siblings are deeply interested in the success of all members of the family. The question is whether the interest in the success of another will, in comparison with self interest, exact the necessary attention and thought to plan and execute a program of training which will be effective. Too often it does not.

The ambition of the parent for the child is often out of balance with our socially accepted code of ethics. The parent may be too anxious to bring success to the child rather than to prepare the child for success. When the parent sacrifices social ethics in order to bring success to the child, and in so doing achieve personal ambition, the child is almost certain to suffer and surely will fail in the field of leadership. If, on the other hand, the training program is pointed toward a full understanding of the feelings and reactions of others and the exercise of judgment and consideration are encouraged,

success will follow in proportion to the effectiveness of the training.

The Setting for Training. - There is nothing more effective than a convincing demonstration. Hence, in the training of young leaders, the organization and functional operation of the training program must be a model of perfection. Here the student must see in operation all the factors which he is told will contribute to the success of a leader. There must be a full and complete understanding of the objective. The limits of authority and responsibility must be clearly defined and scrupulously observed. Each unit must be fully aware of its own weaknesses and of the difficulties of others. There must be a very evident spirit of cooperation and harmony. Each unit and each member thereof should be well informed and proficient. The problem of imparting this knowledge to the student must be approached with a genuine desire to be helpful. There should be no air of superiority exhibited by the instructor to the belittlement of the trainee. It must be plainly evident that all concerned are deeply interested in the problems and progress of the student. This means a personal interest in each individual and the emotional reactions which characterize him. The harmonious functioning of the whole training organization must be such that the student is genuinely thrilled by it and is eager to become an integral part of it. He must be encouraged to take an active part, without fear of censure for first mistakes. But he must feel a sense of responsibility which will cause him to profit from his mistakes

and from those of others. He must be given every possible opportunity to exercise initiative and judgment. Errors of judgment must be reviewed in a sympathetic manner by his instructors. Although a competitive spirit is often necessary to motivation, a feeling of comradeship and esprit de corps must be created. Commonness of purpose must be the core of this feeling of "one for all and all for one".

This task of training leaders is not a simple one. It requires the best talent that there is available. It is surely one of the most important tasks with which we are faced, especially in times of peace. It should merit the most careful attention, both in planning and in the selection of instructors.

Selecting an Ideal. - Everyone, at some time, selects one or more individuals whom he sets up as ideals or examples to be emulated. These models may shift as one grows up and judgment matures. The shift may be the result of a change of interest. What youngster has not cherished the ambition to be a "Casey Jones" or a "Babe" Ruth or maybe a "Bull" Halsey? Ideals also change as acquaintance broadens. As one gets to know his ideal more intimately he may be disappointed and be forced to shift his admiration to another "hero". Often the selected example is someone who is currently successful or someone who is known personally and whose actions and personality can be observed and studied. When an individual is required to make an adjustment to a relatively foreign environment, as in the case of entry into military life from the relatively sheltered environment of the

parental home, this selection of an ideal represents the selection of a personal goal and lends more purpose to one's efforts. This selection is often a part of the early adjustment and results from early impressions. The importance of first impressions, in the proper adjustment of the individual, has been conclusively proven in industry. Since attitudes are often conditioned by early impressions, these impressions become increasingly important in military training. In the first place, military training is much more expensive than industrial training. In the second place, the responsibility which a young and often inexperienced officer is required to assume, especially in wartime, is much greater than anything to be found in industry. As, for example, the full responsibility of the young Officer-of-the-Deck of a light cruiser valued at \$40,000,000 involves the safety of the vessel to say nothing of the safety of more than 1,000 shipmates. Therefore, if the result of this training, which might well hinge on the early adjustment and attitude of the individual, is ultimately a failure the waste may be tremendous.

It must be realized by those who are entrusted with this early adjustment program, that the young student is in a particularly unstable frame of mind and that an incident which, to the fully adjusted individual, would seem quite innocuous will assume tremendous importance to the student. A wrong impression resulting from a relatively insignificant action or word may take months to overcome. In fact, more early failures in the training

of midshipmen are believed by the writer to result from just such careless incidents than from any other cause. Any phase of training must be carefully planned and executed but it is this introductory phase in which the attitude of the student is conditioned for the receipt of the phases that follow.

The impressions formed by the student concerning the interest and the sympathetic helpfulness shown by the instructors during this period of adjustment form the basis of his selection of an ideal personality as a model. Hence, it is not only important that those associated with the training program, and who will serve as early models for the students, should be the best personalities that are available, but also they should be particularly careful of their actions during the early adjustment period of the student. It is felt that entirely too little importance has heretofore been attached to the factor of personality in the selection of instructor personnel. Too much reliance has been placed on the system of weeding out misplaced individuals in the student group by subjecting them to a "third degree" type of treatment on the premise that those who lack the fortitude to "stick it out" are undesirable or lack promise. In a more practical and efficient program, the weeding out would be done before the training begins. There is room for a great deal of improvement in our methods of selection of candidates for leadership training. But, assuming that, in the screening process of selection, the definitely poor risks are excluded, the training program should be directed toward development

of confidence, initiative and ambition successfully to emulate those proven individuals who are assigned as leaders and who should merit the admiration of the student.

CHAPTER III

Training Midshipmen for Leadership.

Efforts to insure superior leadership among the officers of the U.S. Navy has its beginning in the establishment of requirements for entrance into the Naval Academy or into the Naval R.O.T.C. Units of the 52 colleges and universities under the Holloway Plan. The second step is a carefully prepared selection plan that will insure that only those will be admitted to training who possess the innate qualities and those developed qualities of personality which will fit them for a career of successful leadership after a limited period of concentrated training and guided experience. Experience in this type of training has proven to the writer the great importance of this pre-entry screening. The admission to either of these training programs of young men who are obviously not fitted for a military career is a gross waste of the taxpayers' money, a source of inefficiency and a cause of lowered morale throughout the naval organization. Moreover, the discovery of the evident deficiencies of these misplaced individuals during the period of training or after commissioning serves only to point up a previous error. Unless a definite academic deficiency or serious breach of discipline is proven, the obvious remedial action, separation from the service, is seldom practical due to outside influences. Even when separation because of inaptitude is practiced, the waste of time, effort and money in training remains. What is even more important, there results a disappointment to the individual, probably ill feeling

among parents and friends, and detrimental publicity such as was contained in an article published in the October 1947 issue of the Atlantic Monthly. This article, written by a young man who had resigned voluntarily from the Naval Academy, criticized with some validity the techniques of leadership training practiced at the Academy.

The Curriculum. - The four year curriculum at the Naval Academy includes concentrated study of ten subjects classified as scientific-engineering, twelve naval subjects and eight subjects that are classed as social-humanistic. In the training of the Naval R.O.T.C. student who aspires to a commission in the regular navy or the naval reserve, instruction is given in nine technical subjects while, at the same time, the student is pursuing a college curriculum containing a variable number of technical and social subjects. Each of these training programs include periods of practical instruction on board naval vessels cruising at sea. Since technical and professional knowledge is so necessary to good leadership, technical instruction correctly occupies a very important place in the training program. The range of technical subjects is quite wide. The purpose of a wide coverage as opposed to a more specialized program is twofold; first, to give each midshipman a basic understanding of any job to which he might be assigned after commissioning, and second, to increase cooperation through a basic understanding of the problems in other departments.

However, the point which, to the writer, seems to have been neglected in the early planning of training curriculums, is the fact that regardless of the shipboard assignment, adequate training in the principles of leadership is basic. Experience has shown that failure of young officers is more often attributable to a lack of leadership ability than to a lack of technical knowledge. It is also evident that, in most cases, concentrated study, particularly "on station", will result in satisfactory technical know-how within a reasonable time. Unfortunately the same may not be said of leadership. Training in the proper handling of men requires much more time and experience. Therefore, when a young officer reports aboard ship and, in interview, his commanding officer ascertains that he has had little or no training in certain technical fields, an assignment can usually be made wherein his technical deficiencies are of relatively little immediate consequence. If, however, his training as a leader has been neglected, he will be of little value in any job for quite a long time. It seems obvious, then, that training in leadership is even more important than training in any one of the technical fields. If this be so, a comparison of the time and effort spent in training for leadership with that spent in attaining technical proficiency would seem to justify a criticism of the present unbalance in our training curriculums.

It is gratifying to note that a definite effort is being made to bring technical and personnel training more closely into balance. Progress, though slow, is being made. A great deal of progress is

evident when the writer compares his own midshipman training with the program now in effect. Twenty years ago the training at the Naval Academy in the field of leadership consisted of a considerable amount of infantry drill in which approximately 5% of those engaged actually demonstrated some phase of leadership, and approximately six hours devoted to recitation from a small leadership text book, much of the content of which to us then seemed quite remote and irrelevant. To this must be added the so called "Leadership lecture" given by the company officer about every two months which seemed to have little or no advance planning and nothing very concrete to offer. The evaluation of individual leadership aptitude consisted of a numerical estimate by not more than two commissioned officers every four months based on nothing more than a general impression gained through chance acquaintance. There was no break-down of traits and, except for the inevitable disciplinary report, no records of performance were kept. Not only was a reliable estimate impossible, but little or nothing was done to analyze individual differences and to offer remedial guidance. It is indeed unfortunate that so little was made of such an excellent opportunity for training.

At the Naval Academy, a separate leadership course has recently been set up within the Executive Department. A great deal of time and thought has gone into the planning of this course. Undoubtedly time and experience will bring continued improvement. The details of this training will be discussed later in this chapter. A much improved system of aptitude evaluation also has been evolved and, though far from perfect, certainly has a

much more solid foundation than the previous system. The details of this system will also be described later.

The comparative values assigned to technical and leadership training under the present program, in the opinion of the writer, are still out of balance with their demonstrated values in shipboard performance. It would seem logical to assume that with a proper selective process, leadership ability at the beginning of training for a naval career should equal or exceed the candidate's achievements in the fields of military technique. Compared with technical education, training for leadership is a much slower process and development is more gradual. Considering its slow development and its universal importance, it would appear that the time spent in the field of leadership should equal, at least, the time spent in any one of the technical fields.

Although a certain amount of leadership training is interwoven into almost all fields of technical training, it is the stated responsibility of the Executive Department ⁽¹⁾ to concentrate on the teaching of leadership. Of the time allotted to the Executive Department at the Naval Academy for unit training, 75% is spent on infantry close order drill. In this time expenditure in proportion to the real value of infantry in training a naval officer? The writer is inclined toward a negative reply. Granted that to become a good military leader a man must first learn to be a good follower and to obey the orders of superiors. Granted also that the early stages of infantry drill

(1) United Stated Naval Academy Curriculum, 1947. p. 1.

do teach obedience to orders, precision of movement and cooperative performance. However, it is the opinion of the writer that the maximum contribution of infantry drill to this training as a follower is reached by the end of the first year of training.

Let us assume that 25% of the time assigned to infantry in a four year course is of value in developing memory, concentration and coordination. Under normal circumstances, the midshipman, having finished one year of infantry, continues to drill but gains little of value in leadership development during the next two years. It offers him little more before his fourth year when he may have an opportunity to exercise command. In the N.R.O.T.C. unit a midshipman may exercise some sort of command during most of his fourth year of infantry drill. At the Naval Academy, however, the fourth year midshipmen will exercise command less than 50% of the time, usually nearer 30%, depending upon the size of his class. In computing the amount of leadership training which is received from infantry drill in the two training programs it is generously assumed herein that 50% of the time spent by the N.R.O.T.C. midshipman (all of the first and fourth years) and 35% of that spent by the Academy midshipman (all of the first and 40% of the fourth years) contribute to an appreciable degree. With this assumption then and, for comparative purposes, a breakdown is given in Table 1. showing the percentage of time spent in training for leadership and in the various technical fields under the Naval Academy and Naval R.O.T.C. programs for the year 1947-48. It might be well to point out that included under the heading of Leadership are the subjects of Military Law, Organization and Administration of the Navy, Command Relation-

ships, Navy Regulations, Orientation Courses, and in the case of the Naval Academy, a short course in Military Psychology.

Subject	Percentage of Time Devoted to Study	
	Naval Academy (1)	N.R.O.T.C. (2)
English, History & Govt.	14.8	Gen. college
Hygiene	.2	courses taken
Languages	7.5	during training
Social-Humanistic Sub Total	22.5	59.9
Mathematics	14.5	7.2
Electrical Engineering & Physics	19.3	8.9
Marine Engineering	17.1	4.4
Scientific Eng. Sub Total	50.9	20.5
Seamanship	4.1	4.2
Navigation	5.5	3.8
Gunnery	6.0	5.5
Aviation	3.0	
Leadership, Admin., Mil. Law.	1.5	3.7
Professional Sub Total	20.1	17.2
Infantry & Associated Drills	4.9	2.8
Physical Training	1.6	
Military Sub Total	6.5	2.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Table 1.

Percentage breakdown of time devoted to instruction at the U.S. Naval Academy and at 52 civilian colleges under the Naval R.O.T.C. program for the year 1947-1948.

With the assumption that 35% of the time spent on infantry at the Naval Academy and 50% of the N.R.O.T.C. infantry is of value in leadership development, the percentages of time spent in developing leadership under these two programs would be raised to 3.2% and 5.1% respectively.

(1) United States Naval Academy Curriculum, 1947, pp. 30-33.

(2) United States Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps Curriculum, 1947.

Atmosphere and Adjustment. - There can be little doubt that the setting in which the training for any stated purpose takes place has a very marked effect upon the results obtained. The shift from civilian life to military routine is a big one. For most of the young men with whom we are dealing this shift is not only large but probably the first readjustment of any magnitude they have been required to make. Many have never been away from their home towns before or lived apart from their families. For a complete readjustment then, the setting and atmosphere in which naval officer training at the Naval Academy takes place must in itself contribute much to this readjustment. It is here that the Naval Academy program has a great advantage over the civilian college program. Annapolis is a small town rich in historical tradition, picturesque, if not pretty. For over one hundred years the academy has been the focal point of local interest. Many of its residents are retired navy families. It is virtually impossible to escape from that salty atmosphere which always surrounds those who have spent many years at sea. It surrounds one on every side like the heat surrounds a forging in a deep pit furnace. The young midshipman might well predict his future interest in the navy by the interest, the fascination and the feeling of belonging this atmosphere arouses in him. It is quite possible, however, that this feeling is not fully realized until the four years of hard study are almost over and he is about to leave. Those with whom the midshipman associates daily assume that he is there because his main interest is to become a successful naval officer. Those who originally felt that such a career was not their goal

find themselves in an atmosphere which either induces them to alter their view point and to join in with the majority or to become seriously maladjusted. Those in this latter category usually get out or crack up. It is like swimming in a heavy current, you swim with it, get out or drown. Here again is seen the importance of a careful selection of those who are capable of ready adjustment or who already have a keen desire to become enthusiastic naval leaders.

It is indeed unfortunate that it is impossible to surround the naval training programs in the civilian colleges with an atmosphere which is more conducive to an understanding of navy life and tradition. Cruises aboard modern men-of-war during the summer months give the R.O.T.C. student his only well seasoned taste of real navy life. It is therefore important that he be very closely observed during this period to determine his degree of adjustment since little can be estimated from his performance in college where he is required to show only reasonable aptitude while under observation for about five hours a week. The summer cruise affords the R.O.T.C. student all but a very few of his opportunities to demonstrate his real leadership ability. His performance during this period should be very carefully scrutinized and evaluated by the most competent observers available, and the results should carry a great deal of weight in determining which students should be commissioned in the regular navy upon completion of the course.

The Training Staff. - The training staff at the Naval Academy is composed of civilian instructors and officers especially selected

for that duty. The civilian staff members instruct in the cultural subjects of English, History, Government, Mathematics, and Foreign Languages. The more technical subjects of Seamanship, Navigation, Gunnery, Aviation and Marine Engineering are taught almost exclusively by naval officers. Electrical Engineering instruction is given by both officers and civilians. Leadership is taught by the naval and marine corps officers of the Executive Department. The civilian staff changes very infrequently but officers are restricted to a two or three year tour of duty. An officer who has served on the faculty once may be assigned to the Naval Academy for a repeat tour after a tour of sea duty, only at the express request of the Superintendent.

In the selection of officer instructors there is close cooperation between the Superintendent and the Detail Desk ⁽¹⁾ at the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department. The Superintendent keeps the Detail Desk informed as to officer replacement needs and the duty for which the replacements should be especially qualified. It is the duty of the Detail Officer in the Bureau of Personnel to screen the officers available for such an assignment and to investigate their past records carefully in order to find those officers who are best qualified to fill the prospective vacancies at the academy. Individual recommendations are made by the Detail Officer to the Superintendent concerning these officers considered to be available and best qualified for the specific department of instruction in which the vacancy exists. If approved by the Superin-

(1) Desk in the Bureau of Naval Personnel in charge of Officers' assignment to duty.

tendent of the Naval Academy they are assigned.

In the Naval R.O.T.C. program all professional naval instruction is given by naval and marine corps officers and petty officers. It is the duty of the Professor of Naval Science to keep the Detail Officer informed several months in advance as to replacement needs. Selections for assignment are made in a manner similar to that described above except that approval of the Professor of Naval Science is not obtained prior to the issue of orders to duty. It is the duty of the Detail Officer to select those officers for assignment who are believed to be best qualified to teach the subjects involved in the job in which a vacancy exists. An officer so assigned must hold a bachelor's degree. All officers assigned to N.R.O.T.C. duty are sent to Northwestern University for a special course of training for three weeks before reporting for duty. Enlisted men assigned to this duty receive five weeks special training at the Naval Training Station at Bainbridge, Maryland or at San Diego, California before reporting. The normal tour for officer instructors on N.R.O.T.C. duty is either two or three years depending upon their rank, the more senior officers having the longer tour.

Officers reporting for duty at the Naval Academy are assigned to duty as observers in the Executive Department for the first ten days. The purpose of this assignment is to allow the officer to acquaint himself with the current routine of the midshipmen and the policies regarding the authority and responsibility of the midshipmen of various classes. It simultaneously serves to indoctrinate the reporting officer in the objectives of the "aptitude system"⁽¹⁾

(1) System of leadership aptitude evaluation described later in this Chapter.

and the responsibility of the officer instructors in the various academic departments with regard to reports and estimates which they will be required to make in evaluating the aptitude of all midshipman students. This period of indoctrination of officer instructors has been found to improve tremendously the cooperation between the officers of the Executive Department and the teachers in the various academic departments.

Upon completion of this ten day temporary assignment the new officer is assigned to the academic department in which he is considered to be best qualified and in which he is most interested, if it is possible to satisfy both considerations. Having been so assigned, the officer ordinarily remains in the same department for the duration of his tour. Occasionally it is determined after a few weeks or months of service that an officer would be of greater service in another department. It is the policy to make a reassignment in such cases the first opportunity.

An officer reporting for duty to a Naval R.O.T.C. Unit usually comes as a replacement for a given officer and with the qualifications necessary to enable him to assume the instructional duties of the officer whom he relieves. However, here as at the Naval Academy, the final judgment as to duties to which he will be assigned rests with the commanding officer (Professor of Naval Science). After assignment to specific duty the new officer is carefully observed for a period of time to determine the degree of efficiency with which he performs in his new assignment. If performance is not satisfactory,

steps are taken to bring about an improvement. A reassignment to duties for which he seems better qualified may be made or, in rare cases, a request to the Bureau of Naval Personnel may be made for assignment of a relief. Inasmuch as the officer staff of an M.R.O.T.C. Unit consists only of the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer and four assistant instructors, one officer is required to instruct in several different subjects. Instruction in Leadership is given by the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, while Infantry Drills are normally under the guidance of a Marine Corps officer.

The Training Program. - Candidates for entrance to the Naval Academy having passed, in April, an academic achievement examination report for a final physical examination and acceptance at the academy in mid-June. During the remaining months until approximately 1 October the new fourth classmen ⁽¹⁾ are the only midshipmen at the academy. During the first three days after being sworn in, the new midshipmen are engaged in drawing and marking uniforms and items of equipment, studying the regulations and routine and becoming generally acquainted with their new surroundings. During the remaining weeks they are put through a very thorough and concentrated orientation course under close supervision. They receive preliminary instruction in Marine Engineering, English, Mathematics, Gunnery, Aviation, Seemanship, Infantry, Physical

(1) Synonymous with "Freshmen" in a civilian college.

Training, Foreign Languages and Hygiene. This is the crucial period for most of them. During this period officer instructors live very close to their men and observe and counsel them continuously. In order to have a sufficient staff for this individualized instruction twenty of the best leaders of the preceding graduating class are retained at the academy for duty until the completion of this course of orientation. This assures close supervision by one Ensign for approximately every 45 new midshipmen with one senior officer for about every 100 midshipmen. The junior supervisory officers live in the same hall with the midshipmen, each on the same floor with those for whom they are responsible. Midshipmen are encouraged to become reasonably acclimated as soon as possible but are also encouraged to seek the advice of their officer representative whenever necessary.

A major problem of many who have had little or no experience with military life is the exactness of military discipline. Every effort is made to help the new men adjust themselves without feeling the sting of the disciplinary report. Needless to say, however, few succeed in maintaining a completely clean record throughout the summer. Demerits are assigned for breaches of discipline on the same scale as is used during the regular term. An undue accumulation of demerits may result in assignment of physical drill under arms for given periods of time. At the end of the summer indoctrination however, all accumulated demerits are cancelled and the midshipman starts the academic year in October with a clean slate and a considerable amount of valuable experience.

Candidates for M.R.O.T.C. training must be high school graduates between the ages of 17 and 21 on 1 July of the year of entry. A nationwide and fleetwide examination is conducted on a given date to determine a relative aptitude standing among applicants. This examination is of an objective type prepared by the Educational Testing Service, which scores the results and determines a cutting score which will eliminate approximately 65% of the applicants. The successful 35% then report to the nearest Naval Officer Procurement Office for physical examination and interview by two line officers. Interview results are scored on a scale of 1 to 10 points. If the two interviewers differ in estimate by more than two points, the candidate is interviewed by a third officer and the top two estimates are used. In determining a final score in this screening procedure, the national test results carry a weight of 50, high school academic record a weight of 30 and interviews a weight of 20. The records of all physically qualified candidates are presented to the State Selection Committee composed of one prominent civilian, a prominent educator and one Professor of Naval Science. Contained in each record are the following data:

- Personal History Sheet and photograph
- Birth Certificate
- Citizen^{ship} papers (if naturalized)
- The Navy College Aptitude Test Score
- Three reference questionnaires (one of which must be answered by the high school principal)
- High school and college (if applicable) transcripts
- Physical examination report
- Finger print record
- Interviewers appraisal sheets

It is the duty of the State Selection Committee to select, purely on the basis of record information, those best qualified in sufficient number to fill the state quota. The State Selection Committee does not see the candidates whose records it considers. A State's quota is based on the national total authorized for training (depending on appropriations) and the State's relative high school population.

For the academic year 1947-48, appropriations were made for the training of approximately 2600 students under this program. This was the first year in which the program was in full operation. There were approximately 45,000 applicants given the preliminary examination. Approximately 11,000 were selected for further screening after physical examination and interviews. In the State of Ohio over 600 candidate records were reviewed by the State Selection Committee and from this number the state's quota of 142 was finally selected.

A recent survey of the 52 colleges engaged in naval training under the Holloway Plan indicates that in most NROTC Units the upper-class trainees have very little to do with the indoctrination and training of the underclasses except as unit commanders in unit coordinated drills and as key men in gunnery drill teams. In a few instances, however, it has been found necessary to use as instructors in underclass drills, students who have completed the course in naval science but ^{who} are still attached to the unit. This procedure seems to be followed only where there is a shortage of officer and

petty officer instructors regularly assigned. The senior class of N.R.O.T.C. midshipmen obviously has much less opportunity to learn and practice leadership than do their contemporaries at the Naval Academy. Again, in the case of cruise experience, the academy midshipman cruises for three months in each of the three summers following his Plebe year ⁽¹⁾ whereas the N.R.O.T.C. midshipman cruises for two months during each of three summers. It therefore seems apparent that the naval trainee in a civilian institution will have to find other means of practicing and perfecting his ability as a leader if he is to compete successfully with the officer who is trained under the much closer supervision of the Naval Academy.

The first year Naval Academy midshipman, or Plebe as he is called, finds his experiences between October and June varied and packed with memories which he will probably never forget. Many find them thrilling and often trying while some few find them disheartening and requiring more fortitude than they are willing to exhibit. There is no question but that it is a long tough eight months. There have been times when Plebe year was used as a means of eliminating those who lacked the heart and determination to stick it out. Academic subjects came hard and fast, upper classmen seemed determined to break one's spirit if they could. Those who survived swore that they would neither trade nor repeat their experiences for a million dollars. During recent years there has been a considerable change. An air of helpfulness has come to replace the old idea of elimination.

(1) Fourth class or Freshman Year.

The objective of Plebe year at the Naval Academy ^{now} is one of proper indoctrination through example and patient instruction; of proper grounding in the fundamental academic studies and of building an esprit de corps and a feeling of belonging to an organization of fine tradition.

It is true that this objective is not always reached in the case of every midshipman. There are those who are unable properly to adjust themselves to the rigorous routine of military life. There are others who because of the lack of intellectual or academic abilities or emotional stability are unable to maintain satisfactory standards of academic achievement. Of those midshipmen who were admitted in June of 1946, less than 90% remained a year later. Those who survive this year of adjustment and grounding in the fundamentals of a naval career are observed by parents, friends, classmates and supervisors to be more healthy, neater of dress and person, more proud, more enthusiastic, more understanding, more confident of self and quicker of mind than they were when they first joined the ranks of the brigade.

With regard to his training for leadership, the fourth classman learns to be a good follower. He learns to obey orders cheerfully. He learns that a superior expects orders to be executed with precision and exactness without unnecessary discussion or derogatory comment. He learns that he must understand his orders in order to execute them with exactness and completeness. He learns that whereas an order leaves the manner of execution in general up to the recipient of the

order and usually fixes only the time by which the action must be completed. A command leaves nothing to the discretion of the recipient. He learns that in the execution of orders he must rely upon his own resourcefulness to find the most efficient manner of obtaining the desired result. The Plebe learns the importance of getting along well with other people regardless of their personality or his feeling for them. He learns the problems of close personal association and the solutions which will result in the most pleasant environment. He learns that there is a considerable difference in individual personalities and he begins to realize the importance of studying and considering those differences in his relations with others. If he is wise he will make a mental note of the little things about his superiors which irritate him and resolve to be alert to eliminate or guard against them in his own personality when he becomes a leader. In short, leadership training for both of the underclasses consists of learning how to be reliable followers and of observing leaders and fixing firmly in mind the good and bad points which they recognize in order to profit as much as possible from the good examples as well as the mistakes of their leaders. It is not uncommon for an underclassman to select an upperclassman as an ideal to be studied and emulated as opportunities for leadership and development present themselves.

Upperclass Responsibilities. - It is the tradition of the Naval Academy that the two upper classes shall be primarily responsible for the proper indoctrination of the two under classes. It is

encouraging to note that the manner in which these responsibilities are being discharged has taken on a feeling of increasingly serious regard during the years. The writer is confident that the more scientific study of leadership and its responsibilities toward the follower have had much to do with the more recent changes for the better. The authority and responsibility of the third year midshipman toward the underclassmen, though limited is real. The third year at the academy is one of readjustment from a position of little or no responsibility to one of supervised leadership demonstration. The men in this class are just beginning to realize the importance and complexities of leadership problems. It is well that their authority is limited and that they begin exercising it slowly and with considerable care and supervision. During second class year ⁽¹⁾ the midshipman makes final preparations for assuming the role of the leader and begins to show, by his actions and his attitude, ability which will make him an outstanding leader or just another first classman ⁽²⁾ of mediocre accomplishment one year hence. The Class Policy of the Class of 1949 expresses the class responsibilities in these words, "The second class will, in accordance with this policy, instruct the third and fourth classes by their own example in maintaining military discipline within the Brigade, ***. *** the second class will make on the spot corrections of any minor infractions of

(1) Synonymous to Junior Year of a civilian college.

(2) Midshipmen of the senior class.

rates which they observe. They will not, however, undertake punitive responsibilities but will refer any breach of regulations to the first class company commander concerned."

The first class midshipman has reached the level of responsibility which requires demonstrated ability as a leader. From this class are selected the midshipman officers of the brigade. It is the policy of the Executive Department to encourage the midshipmen of the first class to demonstrate their ability as leaders by taking charge of the brigade by developing in all classes a feeling of loyalty and cooperation and ^{by} indoctrinating all midshipmen in accordance with the policies promulgated by higher authority. They are invited to participate in the formulation of new policies and in the revision of old ones where a revision is felt to be justified. They are given to understand that the reputation of the brigade of midshipmen is their responsibility and that the officers of the Executive Department are ready and willing advisors to assist them in the execution of their duties and the development of their individual abilities as leaders of a military organization. The class policy of the present first class clearly expresses the basic principles by which they intend to be guided. "We intend to develop discipline based upon mutual respect and the principles disclosed to us in the recently established Leadership Course. We intend the indoctrination of loyalty and cooperation in and between all classes, with a Brigade "esprit de corps" second to none." We hold that instruction by example is vital to the organization and administration of any military

unit. With the aforesaid principles as guides we shall develop a body of men who will go forth into the Naval Service as better leaders and better officers." The course in military leadership, begun during the second class year, is completed during the first class year. His position of increased responsibility and authority gives every first classman opportunity to practice the principles of leadership and to develop the self-confidence which marks every successful leader. Insofar as is possible, every midshipman of the first class is given an opportunity to command a unit organization for a period of time sufficient to develop his ability to give orders and exercise command.

A New Course in Leadership. - A few years ago the course in leadership at the Naval Academy consisted of approximately six hours study of the small text, "Naval Leadership". This was supplemented by an occasional group discussion with the commissioned company officer on the current problems of the midshipman and the junior officer aboard ship. During the past ten years much has been done to improve the planning^{for} and teaching of leadership.

During the recent war, officers returning from the theaters of operation were invited to lecture to the midshipmen on their combat experiences. Officers with war experience assigned to the academy for duty soon realized that excellent opportunities for improving the leadership training were being neglected. They realized the importance of a well planned program of instruction to give the midshipman a much clearer view of the problems he would face in

dealing with men on board ship in combat operations. A program of planned lectures was begun. Lectures on assigned subjects were written by officers of the Executive Department. These lectures outlined the personnel problems of combat operations. Solutions to typical problems, as determined by individual experiences, were suggested but no attempt was made to present a scientific study of such problems. These were merely stopgap measures to be used until a more scientific course could be set up. Prominent psychologists were consulted on the problem of leadership training. Current practices and policies were analyzed. It was decided that there was a definite need for a well written text on the psychology of military leadership. The curriculum was crowded, an additional course would have to be brief and concentrated. The text should be written in naval terms ^{should} and point up naval personnel problems. The Psychology Department of the University of Maryland was commissioned to write such a text. Dr. Wilmore H. Sanford, himself a naval veteran, undertook the supervision of this work. In the meantime, an academic section was organized within the Executive Department at the academy and given the task of planning and training for leadership through classroom study, directed discussion and group solution of typical problems. Two parts of the proposed text were written by the officers of this academic section. The third part was the psychological presentation prepared by the University of Maryland. The two parts prepared at the academy discuss the characteristics of a naval leader and the techniques of leadership. The latter presentation is

composed principally of typical case studies. The third part, entitled "Psychology for Naval Leaders" is an interesting study of the fundamentals of psychology which contribute to an understanding of the behavior of naval personnel. The combined text entitled "Modern Naval Leadership" is in use this year at the academy as the first scientifically planned study of naval leadership ever presented to midshipmen.

The present academy leadership training program is as follows:⁽¹⁾

Fourth Class - 20 hours, classroom study of Leadership and Naval Orientation
10 hours, lecture presentation of subjects related to leadership.

Third Class - No concentrated study outlined.

Second Class - 32 hours, classroom study including 8 hours of Psychology, (directed discussion).

First Class - 16 hours, classroom study of leadership including four hours of Psychology, (directed discussion).
16 hours, classroom study of Naval Organization and Administration and of Military Law.

This program will total 94 hours, exclusive of Infantry in the study of leadership. Assuming that 35% of the time devoted to infantry drill contributes directly to leadership development, and adding this to the above program, the total is still considerably less than 4% of the entire curriculum!

It is unfortunate that leadership study does not find a place in the third class curriculum. Third classmen feel that they are being left out and that their development is being somewhat neglected. It

(1) United States Naval Academy Curriculum, 1947.

is the hope of the Executive Department that some way will be found to include the third class in this training program.

It is interesting to compare the present leadership training program of the U.S. Military Academy. Eight text books on psychology and military leadership by eminent authors are being used and classroom time is allotted as follows: (1)

First Class	-- 35 hours.
Second Class	-- 30 hours.
Third Class	-- 10 hours.
Fourth Class	-- 5 hours.
Total	130 hours.

In the Naval Academy program, study for classroom discussion is intended to require one hour of preparation. Midshipmen of the first class state that they are finding it very difficult adequately to prepare their assignments, especially in psychology, in the time available. This is probably due to their very limited background in this field and the fact that psychology is so different from the more exact sciences which they are accustomed to studying. The general attitude of the midshipmen regarding the course in leadership is encouraging. The first class seem to be enthusiastic and seriously interested in gaining the maximum from it. The second class are inclined to be skeptical of its intrinsic value. However, this skepticism seems to be replaced by an attitude of enthusiasm when more opportunities for the practice of leadership are afforded.

Evaluation at the Naval Academy. - In order to spot weaknesses,

(1) A Syllabus for Psychology of Military Leadership, U.S. Military Academy, 1947.

place emphasis where most needed, and to measure progress, whether in the individual, ⁱⁿ the group or in the program of instruction, a valid system of evaluation is required. The system now used in evaluating individual ability to perform assigned duties and to discharge the responsibilities of leadership within the brigade of midshipmen, is known as the "aptitude system". It has developed into its present form only during the past ten years. Since such an evaluation is necessarily subjective, the object of the system is to obtain and consider as many carefully prepared individual estimates as possible. Estimates are obtained from many sources and from individuals who are qualified, by close association and observation, to judge the relative ability of all midshipmen except the fourth class. Fourth class aptitude marks are based solely on conduct records.

Every six weeks each instructor submits an aptitude estimate on each of the three upper^{of} class midshipmen whom he instructs. The form now in use is one which can be used on an IBM machine. Samples, front and back, are shown in Figures 1 and 2. All instructors mark the midshipman, provided he feels that his observations are adequate, in the qualities of (1) attitude, (2) bearing and dress and (3) service desirability. In all departments except Mathematics, English and Foreign Languages, marks in a fourth variable, performance of duty, are given. Laboratory work or drills to support a performance mark in these excepted departments are not scheduled. Explanations of the qualities being marked may be found on the back of the card as shown in Figure 2. During the period of one term (four months) academic instructors supply approximately 16 estimates. These

estimates are averaged and submitted on a separate additional card.

During the period of one term approximately 10 estimates of each midshipman's aptitude are made by officers of the Executive Department. Each time a midshipman stands a watch the officer or senior midshipman best able to observe him submits an estimate based on his watch performance. Each term, company and battalion officers make several evaluations of each midshipman in their own unit. Separate estimates are based on the conduct record, extra curricular activities, athletic activities (varsity and intercompany), general observation of performance and attitude, and the performance of any specially assigned duties during the term. Thus these 10 estimates are made by different individuals and are based on different performances and interests. The 10 or more estimates made by the Executive Department are then combined into one average estimate, each of the individual estimates having equal weight.

The third source of evaluation information is the average estimate of one's classmates within the same company. Each midshipman submits, each term, one estimate for each of his approximately 40 company classmates based on general observation. This classmate estimate is the average of the 40 individual estimates and, as an average estimate, carries the same weight as those estimates from the Academic and Executive Departments. Midshipmen take very seriously this responsibility of judging their classmates and their estimates and substantiating comments (which are required) show serious thought and consideration.

Thus each midshipman is evaluated approximately 66 times each

Front of Aptitude Estimate Card.

[illegible]

Back of Aptitude Estimate Card.

term by approximately 50 different individuals. There are three types of association and three somewhat different view points from which observations are made. The average estimate from each of these three sources is given equal weight in computing the overall evaluation. This overall average evaluation is known as the "trial mark". No attempt is made to summarize the comments. The individual estimates with substantiating comments are retained for ready reference.

The main purpose of averaging the marks is to facilitate the arranging of records in rank order. This order is determined by the final trial mark and, except in the case of those whose trial mark is less than 2.50 (the lower cutting score), the trial mark serves no other purpose. Any midshipman, whose trial mark is less than 2.50, receives a final term mark in aptitude equal to his trial mark. All other records having been arranged in rank order of trial marks within a given class and battalion, final marks are then assigned in accordance with the distribution given in Table 2. This table as plotted in Figure 3 approximates a standard distribution. Thus, for example, the top 1% of a given class in a given battalion receive a final mark of 3.9; the next 1% a 3.5; the next 2% a 3.7 etc. The mean of this table is 3.22. The prescribed distribution is restricted to a given class and battalion because of the difference in experience between classes and the possible difference of standards by which the different battalion officers of the Executive Department may gauge their estimates.

Mark	Percentage of Midshipmen	Mark	Percentage of Midshipmen
3.9	1	3.1	10
3.8	1	3.0	8
3.7	2	2.9	6
3.6	5	2.8	4
3.5	7	2.7	2
3.4	10	2.6	1
3.3	17	2.5	1
3.2	25		

Table 2.
Standard Distribution of Midshipman Aptitude
Marks




Figure 3.

Graphic Plot of Table 2

Knowledge of Progress. - Whereas it was formerly the custom for company and battalion officers to call into conference only those midshipmen whose aptitude estimates indicated that their over-all ability was unsatisfactory or that definite and serious weaknesses had been observed by several people, it is now customary at the end of each term to interview each midshipman and discuss with him the estimates and comments others have made regarding him. The estimate cards are not shown to him. Neither is he informed as to what esti-

mates or comments any given individual has made. It is felt to be entirely proper, however, to indicate the general estimate made by the three evaluating groups, the academic departments, the Executive Department, and his classmates. Substantiating comments, with no indicating of source, are read to him.

The company officer seeks to give the midshipman a picture of himself as others see him. Although complimentary remarks are encouraging to the midshipman, the real purpose of these conferences is to discuss with him the weaknesses which others have observed and the possible underlying causes. Neither weakness nor cause may have been realized by the midshipman himself. It is then the duty of the officer advisor to suggest ways and means of overcoming these weaknesses. Such man-to-man talks between the midshipman and his commander serve to increase the respect with which the midshipman regards his superior officers as well as to increase the understanding with which the officer guides or leads the midshipman.

It is interesting to note that no attempt has yet been made to correlate or otherwise compare the grades earned by a midshipman in the course in leadership with the estimate of his aptitude. It would appear that such information would furnish the company or battalion officer with excellent material for discussion with the midshipman concerning the practical application of the principles taught in the leadership course and would, at the same time, indicate the seriousness with which the midshipman views the development of his own practical ability to lead.

The Practice of Leadership at the Naval Academy. - Due to the limited opportunity of underclassmen to practice leadership under normal routine, it is doubly important that they be alert to every possible opportunity and that they make the most of every chance to gain experience. Underclass watches consist mainly of sentry and messenger type duties. There are however, some opportunities to develop ability and confidence. Leadership of academic class sections, marching to and from recitation, provides some command experience. As members of groups participating in practical drills and laboratory work midshipmen may demonstrate their ability to organize and lead group effort. Participation in group athletics and other extra-curricular activities provides a wonderful opportunity to improve one's own cooperative habits and influence the cooperative team spirit in others. The summer cruises on seagoing ships of the fleet provide many situations in which the promising leader may gain valuable experience. However, it is felt that the average midshipman does not realize the importance of capitalizing on these opportunities. It should be one of the main objectives of the leadership course to impress the midshipmen with the importance of gaining practical experience whenever possible and to remove the all too common feeling that responsibility brings nothing but trouble. The midshipman who is content merely to "hold the bag" of responsibility is losing precious opportunities which all too seldom repeat themselves. All underclassmen should study the practical demonstrations of leadership which their seniors are exhibiting daily before them. Some of them may be good; some may be weak in spots. It is for the underclass to observe and study seniors and their

methods, with criticism entirely self-contained and with the view to self-profit from such demonstrations..

The second classman should be an eager understudy of the first classman and should prepare himself to assume responsibility and leadership at a moment's notice. Second classmen on watch are usually assistants to first class administrators. Most first classmen in positions of leadership in brigade activities are assisted by second class understudies. Three different sets of brigade officers are selected from the second class and stand by during the course of the year to take command of the brigade in the absence of the first class. The successful demonstration of leadership ability on the part of a second classman will assure him of greater opportunities as a first classman. This opportunity to indicate his ability may come suddenly and unexpectedly. The wise understudy will be prepared. The second class cruises separately on aircraft carriers during the summer. Here they serve for the first time without upperclass supervision. As cruise leaders they supervise only their own classmates but this task is often a tough assignment. Moreover, any midshipman who can lead his own classmates and obtain enthusiastic support can certainly lead a subordinate group by similar methods. Nothing but positive leadership will bring support from classmates.

The first classman is given every possible opportunity to practice leadership. There are three groups or sets of midshipman brigade officers appointed during the academic year. A midshipman serving as an officer in the first set is excluded from such service in the second set. The third and final set of midshipman officers

are those who have demonstrated their superior ability. They are the so-called "cream of the crop". Although most of the final set have previously served as midshipmen officers such service is not a prerequisite. All first class watch duty is administrative and provides one of the best possible opportunities for the midshipman to demonstrate, and for his supervising officers to evaluate, his administrative ability. Positions of leadership in coordinated drills of seamanship and gunnery go to first classmen. Intercompany and interbattalion athletic and academic competitions are organized and run by the first class. Leaders in varsity athletics and extra-curricular activities are first classmen. A large proportion of the indoctrination and training of the underclasses is a responsibility of the first class. The importance of this task sometimes is not fully recognized by the individual first classman. The improvement of his attitude toward underclass indoctrination is and has been the object of serious study on the part of the Executive Department. Out of this study have come policies and training procedures which are gradually improving both the attitude and results. The former practices of subordination and occasional humiliation have given way to a program of interest development and supervised study of professional fundamentals.

N.R.O.T.C. Student Aptitude. - Though the procedure by which the aptitude of the N.R.O.T.C. student is evaluated has not yet been developed as fully and scientifically as in the case of the Naval Academy midshipman, a definite effort is made to observe closely the characteristics of the naval science student and to make an appraisal of his leadership potentialities. Current directives indicate that the following traits should be considered in evaluating aptitude for leadership: (1)

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (1) Conduct. | (6) Military Bearing and Neatness. |
| (2) Leadership. | (7) Performance of duty. |
| (3) Interest. | (8) Military courtesy. |
| (4) Initiative and Industry. | |
| (5) Cooperation | |

In the opinion of the writer, "leadership" is entirely too broad and inclusive a term to be used as a factor in this evaluation. All of the other factors listed contribute to leadership. It is, in fact, aptitude for leadership that is being judged. Also, it would seem practical to combine as a contributing trait, military courtesy with military bearing.

No specific method is prescribed by which to reach a decision as to relative aptitude. Consequently the evaluation procedure of each training unit varies considerably. In general a separate evaluation is made each quarter or semester and, these, combined with a cruise mark, the weight of which is equal to that of the preceding academic year's mark, become contributing factors in the computation of each student's relative standing within his class and unit for the year. The annual six to eight week cruise of regular naval

(1) Regulations for the Administration and Training of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, 1947, p.26.

students and the single three week cruise of contract students offers by far the best opportunity to judge the student's aptitude.

Because of the great variation in procedure for making this evaluation, the practice of one unit only will be cited. The estimate for the Fall Quarter originates with the infantry drill master who is believed to have had the best opportunity to observe the qualities of leadership during this period. Considering all of the factors above-mentioned, the drill master assigns a single mark based on the navy rating scale of 0.0 to 4.0. This estimate, with substantiating remarks, is submitted to the Professor of Naval Science via all classroom instructors. These instructors either indicate agreement with the original mark assigned or submit alternate marks with substantiating comment. The final evaluation is the responsibility of the Professor of Naval Science after considering the estimates and comments of all the instructors. For Winter and Spring Quarters, the estimates originate with a classroom instructor and are passed through the hands of the drill master and all other instructors who have had contact with the student. Conduct is integrated with these performance estimates by deducting a specific amount from the final average mark for each disciplinary report substantiated during the quarter.

Practical Experience of the N.R.O.T.C. Student. - In the practice of leadership within the N.R.O.T.C. training program, very little opportunity is afforded aside from the limited number of coordinated drills and exercises. One set of 16 student officers serves throughout the year. Command experience is thus afforded for three company commanders and nine platoon commanders in addition to four members of the battalion staff. Thus command experience is gained by only 25%

of the members of the normal senior class of the unit. Because these students are normally under naval training only one hour per day, five days per week and because the upper and under classes have few relations with each other, outside of the short and relatively infrequent drills, much of the practice of leadership must come from other activities of their school and social life and, of course, these activities rarely come under the scrutiny or supervision of naval instructors. In short, there is relatively little opportunity for the naval instructor to make observations upon which to base an accurate estimate of the student's leadership aptitude. This is a very unsatisfactory situation and the solution of this very important problem is not readily apparent under existing conditions. It becomes increasingly important therefore that the most be made of the opportunities afforded by the summer cruises to develop and observe individual leadership ability.

CHAPTER IV

Current Problems

The over-all, long range project of selecting candidates for training and officers to instruct them, of planning and carrying out a well-balanced and productive program of leadership training, and of properly evaluating the results produced, presents many and various problems. It would be impractical, if not impossible, to enumerate them all even without thought of possible solutions. However, in the opinion of the writer, there are five very broad problems that should receive immediate attention and careful study. An attempt will be made to briefly present these problems.

Briefly, the goals of the leadership training program are: (1) to produce better leaders, (2) to do it more efficiently by less waste of time, effort and money, (3) to lose, by resignation, fewer trainees who have ability, and (4) to pass to the fleet fewer junior officers who have neither ability nor capacity for development in the field of leadership.

Candidate Selection. - The first, and probably the most important problem is that of selecting for training, those young men who appear to possess the greatest capacity for leadership development. The candidate, at the time of selection will have already had 16 to 20 years of parental training and life experience. This training may have been good or it may have been poor. It is obvious that one cannot hope to counteract, in four years, the attitudes and habits which have been developed in the previous twenty. Therefore, the first problem is to determine as accurately as possible what positive traits have been

developed most significantly up to the time of application for naval training.

Present instruments for measuring traits of personality and capacity for positive leadership are, as yet, somewhat unreliable. However, improvements are being made as a result of study and experiment. Stuit, speaking of personal inventories and such devices for measuring personal adjustment, says, "Further development of such measuring devices might result in instruments which could be used not only to identify the men likely to be trouble makers and misfits in the service but also to aid in selecting officers and men who might be especially effective in positions of leadership and responsibility. This is an important area which deserves a coordinated program of study." (1) The selection of candidates for training as military leaders is quite a different problem, in many respects, from that of selecting social, industrial, or political leaders. "The work of an officer calls not merely for the summation of a number of isolated qualities, but upon the whole man, and it is essential to select those who possess highly developed character traits of a certain kind. Consequently, tests of personality and temperament occupy an important place beside the necessary intelligence and technical aptitude tests." (2)

(1) Stuit, Dewey B., (Editor) Personnel Research and Test Development in the Bureau of Naval Personnel., Princeton, J.J: Princeton University Press, 1947., p. 439.

(2) Farago, L., (Editor) German Psychological Warfare. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942, p. 171.

Scott and Clothier suggest that "superiority in intelligence above a certain minimum contributes relatively less to business success than does superiority in several non-intellectual traits of personality.

Selecting candidates for military leadership training is a problem which must be worked out with that specific purpose in mind. It is not one which can profitably be delayed to await a solution in social or industrial studies. It is a problem which the military services, with any outside aid now available, must solve for themselves. Undoubtedly it will take years to perfect a system of reliable selection. That is all the more reason why it must receive increased and immediate attention.

The present selection system measures quite well the academic capacity and achievement of applicants. However, the evaluation of personality and leadership ability, or capacity for its development, is left entirely to the congressmen who appoint the majority of Naval Academy candidates. In the case of N.R.O.T.C. selections, much personality evaluation is left to several three man boards in various parts of the country. Their standards inevitably vary somewhat and the information on the candidate's qualities is not always fully adequate. There is no doubt that those who are now responsible for this selection on the basis of personality and leadership ability do the best they can with the material evidence and time available to them. Yet each year there are numerous cases of maladjustment, aptitude failures and academic failures directly traceable to poor adjustment or lack of interest. The loss of time,

effort and moneyⁱⁿ attempting to train those midshipmen who, because of inability to adjust themselves, resign during the first two years would go a long way toward supporting the development of an improved system of candidate selection.

Many of these midshipmen, though lacking in leadership aptitude manage to maintain satisfactory academic marks during their course of training. A recent change of policy has implemented the creation of an aptitude board at the Naval Academy, under the direction of the Commandant of Midshipmen, to investigate cases of outstanding inaptitude. Even though a midshipman is academically satisfactory, if he appears to be incapable of developing satisfactory characteristics of military leadership, the board may recommend the acceptance of his resignation. This is surely a step in the right direction and indicates the importance now being attached to leadership qualification. However, a midshipman who has demonstrated such inaptitude and maladjustment will have been the cause of a great waste of time, money and effort before his case will have been reviewed by the aptitude board. In 1943, four Naval Academy graduates were not commissioned because of lack of aptitude for service. The cost of transportation of candidates, midshipman pay, subsistence and services for the fiscal year 1948 amounted to \$1,535 per midshipman enrolled at the academy. This does not include the prorated cost of the operation of the training institution. Were this latter cost to be included, as it properly should, the cost of educating each midshipman for four years, at present price standards, would amount to approximately \$19,000 per man. The failure of four midship-

man graduates to meet the qualifications for a commission represents a loss to the government of approximately \$75,000. Not only might such waste be prevented, but the task of elimination would be much simpler and the resultant adverse effect, personal and public, would be much less if such elimination could be accomplished at the time of original screening.

Those whose performance is low, but not low enough to be eliminated during the course of instruction, if commissioned, almost invariably become a source of anxiety to their commanding officers in the fleet and a disappointment to their subordinate associates. During the term ending 30 May, 1947 at the Naval Academy there were six first classmen, five second classmen and five third classmen whose military aptitude was estimated at 2.5, the minimum passing mark. Each of these individuals who fail to develop into reliable leaders by the time they reach the commissioned level reduce still further the now very limited capacity of that training institution.

Instructor Selection. - The second problem deals with the selection of instructors for the leadership training program. Broadly speaking, this would include all instructors, since leadership enters into training all fields. However, here it is proposed to summarize only the problem of selecting officers for assignment to the Naval Academy and to the 52 N.R.O.T.C. Units under the Holloway Plan.

Under the present policy of duty rotation, between sea and shore, the first factor to be considered is availability. This is further complicated by the almost continuously fluctuating size of the fleet and shore establishment, which in turn depends upon appropriations and the world situation. Therefore, it is imprac-

tical to attempt to set up any hard and fast rules as to availability or length of tour. Stability, with sufficient change of duty to give an officer a well rounded experience and balanced sense of proportion is, nevertheless, desirable. Assignment for repeat tours of duty are desirable for those who show outstanding aptitude in leadership development.

The problem of expressed duty preference on the part of the officers available must also be considered. An officer of experience who has been successful in the performance of duties which are also of interest to him will normally express preference for that type of duty. Here it must be borne in mind that proven ability and continued interest are excellent predictors of future success in the same type of work. An officer who has proven his ability and interest in a given duty will look forward to a repeat assignment to a similar billet. On the other hand, preference for a certain type of duty may often be expressed without exact knowledge of the responsibilities involved and qualifications required. This must be considered in the assignment for original tours in any type of duty.

As to the problem of which units or schools will have priority in the selection of officers available for assignment, a definite policy must be determined and promulgated to those concerned with selection and assignment. Since the object of the leadership training program is the production of more and better leaders, it would seem logical that this program should stand at the top of the priority list for the assignment of proven leaders.

We now come to the inevitable problem of determining who qualifies as a "proven leader". Qualification and performance records are discouragingly weak in evidence upon which to base a valid judgment. The fitness report, which at present is the only record upon which to base an opinion, is at best a poor rating scale invariably skewed to the favorable side. Furthermore, there is little in a fitness report to indicate an officer's ability to instruct others. The officer or group concerned with instructor assignment is personally acquainted with only a very small percentage of those from whom he must make his selection.

The problem, therefore, is one of selecting, with the aid of relatively inadequate information, from those officers who are available for shore duty, those who have either previously proven themselves in a similar assignment or who appear to be best qualified for a specific instructional assignment and who are desirous of such an assignment.

Improving the Training Program. - Having selected the most promising candidates for training and assigned the most able instructors to training institutions, the program will still lack efficiency unless there is a balanced curriculum and a system of presentation that will produce the best results at minimum cost.

The curriculum must change with the development of new ideas and techniques. It must be rebalanced periodically in accordance with new estimates of the importance of various fields

of study. Technical development causes a shift of emphasis from one field to another as, for example, from celestial navigation to electronics for the use of radar and Loran.⁽¹⁾

The need for superior leadership is not new. It does appear, however, that its universal application in every field is now being realized with the result that added importance is being attached to its proper development. Studies in personality and leadership development, conducted during the last few years, have indicated that this ability can be developed more readily by improved training methods and that, in the preparation for a naval career, such training deserves more time and attention than it has received in the past.

The already overcrowded training schedule will not permit the assignment of more time to leadership study without a decrease in the time allotted to other subjects. Either the over-all training period of midshipmen must be lengthened or cuts must be made in the technical training. If the latter alternative is to be accepted, the problem then becomes one of determining what phases of technical training seem to be of the least practical value and may best be eliminated. In the meantime, the problem of setting up an improved program of leadership training must be tackled. This entails a survey of the current literature and recommended systems of leadership training. When additional time is made available for this important training, it must be used to maximum profit.

Evaluation During Training. - Any well set up system of

(1) Long range navigation by use of electronic waves.

training includes a valid system of progress evaluation. While we are improving our methods of leadership development, we should seek to improve our systems of measuring training progress. Much has been done in the last seven years to increase the accuracy of estimating the midshipman's aptitude for service. Much remains to be done.

The problem of how best to judge the qualities of leadership possessed by an individual is a very difficult one. In the first place, the qualities which contribute most to one's ability to lead must be determined. In the second place, the measuring instrument must be as accurate as possible. The measure of personal qualities exhibited can, at best, be only a subjective estimate. The accuracy of such an estimate will, however, increase in proportion to the number and ability of the judges. The number of estimators can readily be increased. It has been increased about twenty fold at the Naval Academy within the past 15 years. The ability of the judges has also increased, though to a lesser degree, by bringing about an increased realization of the importance of their function and by more serious study of the principles of leadership and by a closer observation of those being judged. Efforts to improve the system of evaluation of individual qualities are continuing with promising results. A more standardized system is needed in the N.R.O.T.C. program.

The opportunities of the individual midshipman to demonstrate his abilities are now somewhat more numerous in the case of the two upper classes at the Naval Academy but appear not to have become appreciably more frequent to the two junior academy classes or to the

N.R.O.T.C. student. Under the present curriculum of training it may not be practical to increase the frequency of such opportunities although every effort should be made to do so. The problem then becomes one of how to make a greater use, in evaluation of aptitude, of those opportunities which are afforded.

Post Training Evaluation. - The fifth problem to be considered involves gathering from the fleet, information relative to the demonstrated ability of the newly commissioned officers after they have served for a period on board ship and have faced the practical problems of shipboard leadership. The use of such information would be (1) a general evaluation of the improvement being achieved in leadership training, (2) a check on the accuracy of the aptitude estimate system in predicting leadership ability, and (3) a means of determining what areas of leadership training require increased attention during the period of instruction.

After commissioning, the members of a graduating class are assigned to ships of the fleet. In 1947, graduates were assigned to large auxiliaries, large amphibious ships, destroyers and large combatant ships. With such distribution not more than a few classmates serve together under the same commanding officer. Estimates coming from these many sources would normally be based on slightly varying standards set up by the different commanding officers. The difficult part of the problem is, therefore, to get estimates which would be sufficiently valid and reliable for any value in judging the success of the training program.

However, there is no doubt in the mind of the writer that if

the training units were apprised of the fleet's opinion in regard to the relative strength and weaknesses of the leaders who were being sent out to them, the training program could gradually be improved. So far as can be learned, only one attempt has been made to obtain such information. A survey of all fitness reports for one academy class is reported to have been conducted recently. Attempts were made to compare performance thus reported with performance observed while the same individuals were midshipmen. This survey is said to have indicated only that a positive correlation (exact value unknown) existed between demonstrated leadership in the fleet and service as a midshipman brigade officer.

A further study of the problem of post training evaluation in the field of leadership, and in technical fields as well, would certainly furnish the training institutions with valuable information upon which to base possible revisions of the training program. Industry is continually trying to improve the quality of its products. The most important source of information upon which to base such effort is the report of the consumer and the field representative. No less important is the report from the fleet on the ability of the newly commissioned officers which are being supplied by the training institutions.

CHAPTER V

Conclusions and Recommendations

The author's purpose in writing this paper has been to emphasize the fact that leadership is of major importance in every field of naval endeavor and to review the methods now being developed for training midshipmen as leaders and junior officers. The fundamental qualities that characterize the successful leader have long been a subject of debate. The author has sought only to present for consideration those qualities which are of general value to the naval officer under different situations of environment. There can be little doubt, however, that the successful naval officer must, above all else, be able and willing, when necessary, to assume a position of leadership in a great variety of situations. To insure such capability he must be carefully selected, properly trained under the guidance of the best leadership instructors available, and must be as fully developed, by study and experience, as possible. Progress of individual development during training should be carefully measured to obtain maximum instructional effectiveness. Through the cooperative effort of the training institutions and the operating establishment, continuous improvement in the training program should be sought. The necessary follow-up, observation and evaluation of the leadership ability demonstrated by graduates, should not be neglected.

The five problems set forth in the previous chapter seem, to the writer, to be those in which study would be most profitable at this time. The final solutions are not clearly apparent without a

great deal more study and research. Conclusions, therefore can only be general and recommendations tentative, intended only as suggestions for further study.

Improved Screening of Candidates. - In the selection of candidates for officer training, personal experience and study from different points of view lead to the conclusion that any improvement in the original screening of candidates which would reduce the number of trainees who are unable adequately to adjust themselves or who, because of personality or background, tend to develop an attitude which conflicts with the dictates of military effectiveness, would be a valuable advancement. It appears probable that more careful screening of applicants would result in:

- (1) The production of graduates of greater ability.
- (2) Less money wasted on failure.
- (3) Greater trainee aptitude and a reduction in the number of failures.
- (4) Fewer maladjusted trainees, simplifying the problem of training.
- (5) Improving the morale and the performance of the more capable trainees.
- (6) Increasing the output of able leaders without having to increase the training facilities.

The achievement level of the candidate is determined with considerable reliability by the present entrance examination. Experience with the U.S. Naval Academy Aptitude Test during the last 15 years has proved its reliability in spotting probable academic failures. It is unfortunate that empirical data are not now available upon which to compute the validity of this aptitude test battery. It seems logical

that if each candidate is given a valid achievement test, a valid aptitude test, and if a means is provided for judging his personality with at least some validity, the results of selection would be considerably improved. Though the instruments for evaluating personality are reputedly unreliable, the writer is of the opinion that an instrument could be built which would give some indication as to a candidate's suitability for naval training. Officers who, as midshipmen, have made the adjustment from a civilian to a military life and who, in some cases, as instructors, have helped others to make the change should be the most fully acquainted with the personality requirements. Yet, except in the case of the trainees who enter the academy from the fleet or from the Naval Reserve, these officers have no opportunity to size up a prospective candidate until after he has been enrolled for training. The decision as to whether or not most candidates have the requisite personality then is being made by those who are not the most intimately acquainted with the military environment.

The Army has developed an instrument, known as the Biographical Information Blank, which is designed to evaluate a candidate's (1) environmental background, (2) interests, (3) attitude and (4) social adjustment. These four factors are believed to contribute heavily to an individual's personality. This instrument is reported by Jenkins ⁽¹⁾ to have a validity of +.35 with a very high reliability in a study of 3000 cases. In combination with the Army's Officer Efficiency Report (validity +.60) and an individual interview

(1) Jenkins, W.O. "A Review of Leadership Studies". Psychology Bulletin, Jan. 1947, pp. 72-74.

(validity +.39) validity for the battery is reported as +.67 with almost perfect agreement in selection of the high, middle and low thirds. If such a battery can select with such reliability, it seems reasonable to conclude that a battery consisting of the Naval Academy Entrance Examination, the Naval Academy Aptitude Test and a personality-interest audit, similar perhaps to the Biographical Information Blank of the Army, would select Naval Academy candidates with greater reliability than is now obtained with the achievement instrument alone.

It is recommended, therefore, that consideration be given to the development of an instrument for measuring personality or attitude and interest and that it be combined with the achievement and aptitude tests now given, to form a battery with which to select those candidates most likely to succeed in naval training.

It is further recommended that a suitable selection instrument, of the objective and machine scored type, be developed for the use of Members of Congress in determining which four⁽¹⁾ of their several applicants are best suited for a naval career and that they be encouraged to use such a standardized instrument for competitive selection.

Members of Congress have the privilege of using the Naval Academy Entrance Examination as a tool for determining which of their four recommended candidates shall receive the principal and which the alternate appointments. Those who are not ranked in this manner are

(1) Members of Congress are authorized to recommend a principal and three alternates for each authorized vacancy.

the only trainees who enter the academy without competition. It is recommended that legislation be sought to require all appointments to be competitive. If this recommendation is not concurred in, it is then recommended that reasonable effort be made to induce as many Congressmen as possible to avail themselves of this privilege of selecting, by examination, those best fitted to succeed.

Instructor Selection. - The problem of officer placement is one that has received much attention. Considering the size of the naval organization and the variety of positions to be filled, comparatively few officers are improperly placed. The more recent emphasis on the development of leadership does, however, increase considerably the importance of selecting for positions of leadership instruction, those officers who have proven themselves as leaders capable of developing leadership in others. It is unfortunate that the present fitness report does not provide for an estimate of teaching ability.

Without a more detailed study of officer assignment, the author concludes that officer placement in the field of leadership training can be improved only by providing more adequate information as to proper qualifications of officer instructors and more accurate and complete performance reports in the field of leadership instruction. The replacement needs of training institutions must be known by the officer detail section well in advance of the prospective replacement data.

It is recommended therefore, that all training units, parti-

cularly those training junior officers, maintain a close liaison with the Bureau of Personnel regarding specific positions to be filled and the personal qualifications required for successful performance in those billets. This information should be supplied sufficiently in advance and in sufficient detail to permit a careful survey and selection from among those officers available for such assignment. It is further recommended that with continued study to determine those qualities which are considered to be most important in a leadership instructor, an effort be made to evolve an improved system of evaluating and reporting officer qualifications for such an assignment.

It is recommended that the Naval Academy receive top priority in the assignment of officers best qualified to develop leadership in junior officers and that officers who prove themselves to be outstandingly capable be given repeated tours of such duty when ashore. N.R.O.T.C. Units should follow the Naval Academy on the priority list.

Improvement of the Training Program. - Much improvement has been effected in the leadership training program. Efforts to continue this improvement must not slacken. Improved systems of evaluation will undoubtedly indicate points of weakness which must receive serious and concentrated attention.

It is the conclusion of the writer that more time should be allotted to the study of psychology and the techniques of military leadership, in both the Naval Academy and the Naval R.O.T.C. training programs. It appears that much of the time now spent in close order infantry drill, especially at the Naval Academy, is of questionable

value in training naval leaders. The conclusion therefore follows that a decrease in the time spent in infantry drill would permit more time for leadership study and practice and with profitable results. The course in leadership should be so oriented that study is continuous through the four year curriculum with increasingly concentrated study and increasing authority and responsibility in the practical application of developed ability. Midshipmen must be made to realize that no one special ability will be as important in assuring success in a naval career as that of positively leading group activity in the efficient accomplishment of assigned tasks.

It is recommended that increased effort be made to determine the areas of leadership training which fleet experience indicates need increased emphasis. It is believed that a closer or more direct line of communication between the training institutions and the fleet with a free and full exchange of ideas would result in a more rapid improvement of the quality of leaders developed. The author is tempted to recommend the assignment of one officer to each the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet as a liaison between the fleet and the training activities. It would be this officer's duty to continually circulate among the ships of the fleet, observing the newly commissioned officers, talking with them, conferring with the ship's commanding and executive officers and reporting back to the training institutions and the Bureau of Naval Personnel the results of such observations and conferences and forwarding any suggestions for the improvement of training. This liaison officer might well serve as the coordinator of training surveys both in technical and non-technical fields and ^{he} could be of considerable

service to the fleet and the training activities.

Improving the Evaluation of Training Progress. - Knowledge of progress during training is important to both the instructor and the trainee. The more accurate this knowledge or evaluation of demonstrated ability, the more efficient the instruction program can be. The accuracy of such measurement rests first on the establishment of valid criteria. A study of the characteristics of individuals who have successfully demonstrated leadership ability and comparison with those of less successful individuals appears to be the only logical means of determining the criteria upon which to base this measurement of training progress. Until these criteria are more definitely established, little can be done to evolve a more accurate measuring device.

Midshipmen must be trained to recognize and take advantage of all opportunities to practice leadership and by so doing to demonstrate their ability. Effort should be made to increase the opportunities afforded to all classes of trainees. When opportunity to "take charge" has been neglected repeatedly it may be necessary to force the assumption of responsibility until sufficient self-confidence has been built up or the individual has definitely proven inaptitude.

Without further study the author is able to recommend few improvements in the evaluation system now in use. Personal experience as a midshipman instructor and evaluator suggests the conclusion that much activity now participated in by midshipmen and which may be indicative of his personality and leadership ability passes

unnoticed. It is recommended that study of the training program be continued with the purpose of increasing the opportunities of the trainee to practice and demonstrate leadership and that attention of all instructors be drawn to the importance of observing as closely as possible the activities and attitudes of all classes of midshipmen and of keeping records and of making estimates of increasingly validity.

It is the conclusion of the writer that the Aptitude Estimate Form now in use at the Naval Academy has been over simplified in one respect. In the traits under the heading of "Attitude" (see Fig. 2), ability to adapt one's self to changed conditions seems to be improperly placed. Adaptability, according to Kuhlman, Pitner, Stern and Burtt and others, is an indication of intelligence rather than attitude. It is recommended that adaptability be considered and evaluated separately. Inasmuch as adjustment is mainly dependent upon ability of an individual to adapt himself to the environment in which he finds himself, such ability is considered sufficiently important to deserve special attention and evaluation.

Fleet Evaluation of Demonstrated Leadership. - The problem of post-training evaluation is an important but difficult one. It is important because we need to know the quality of the product of our training program if improvement and progress are to be attained. Despite its importance, little success has been achieved in devising a good measuring instrument. The difficulties are many. Adequate criteria by which to reliably judge the quality of our young leaders have not been determined. Without reliability, validity is impossible. However, there appears now to be little or no information gathered

in the operating units which can be of value to the training activities in improving the ability or the professional balance of the graduated trainee. It appears also that some information of value could be made available. The improved techniques of gathering this information and of increasing its validity will have to come with experience.

Such information from the operating units might well include:

(1) An indication of which of the desirable qualities seem to be weakest in the junior commissioned officer ^{which therefore} and _^ may require increased emphasis during the training period.

(2) A comparison between Naval Academy graduates and N.R.O.T.C. graduates to indicate wherein the training of one group might be improved by a study of the training program of the other group.

(3) A comparative estimate of the average technical ability of one graduating class group and the average leadership ability of the same group. This might indicate an unbalance in the training program between the technical studies and the more abstract studies of psychology and leadership. In this regard N.A. and N.R.O.T.C. groups should be considered separately.

(4) Suggestions for increase or decrease of emphasis where unbalance is indicated.

(5) Ranking, according to the demonstrated leadership ability, of the members of one graduate group in each ship of the fleet. Correlation of such ranking with predicted ability would furnish information for improvement of the "Aptitude Estimate."

(6) Well considered information from graduates as to the

adequacy of the training program in fitting them to meet and solve the problems of leadership which they have encountered during their early experience in operating units.

As indicated earlier in this chapter it is believed that officers specially trained and assigned to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic and Pacific Fleets could be of great service in gathering such information and acting as a liaison between the operating units and the training activities.

As a very rough idea as to the feasibility of gathering such information by the use of a standardized form report, the form outlined hereinafter, and illustrated in Figures 4 to 19 inclusive, is submitted. Both the reliability and the validity of a forced choice type of measuring instrument would be higher than that of a merit rating scale type of instrument. However, the building of a forced choice type of report requires a great deal more time and research than is available at this time. The less desirable merit rating scale is recommended for use until such time as an improved type can be developed. It is recommended that this report be submitted about 1 May of each year after the graduate has had about 10 months of experience in the fleet.

The scale as submitted herein requires a subjective estimate of 16 of the 17 traits presented in this paper as contributing to leadership ability. Little opportunity is afforded to estimate physical courage as observed in the normal activities of peacetime operations and has therefore been omitted in this estimate report. The traits have not been named in the rating scale due to the different

interpretations which would surely result. An attempt has been made to bring the specific quality to mind by the use of questions. Due to probable overlap and inability to reliably differentiate between intelligence and acumen and between honor and moral courage, these four have been combined into two. To assist in determining the desired rating in each trait, short descriptive phrases have been given for each grade within each trait estimate.

To decrease the probability of halo effect each trait estimate is made on a separate page and it is the intention that all the officers concerned be rated in one trait before going on to the next. Research among psychologists and military and naval students present has indicated a considerable difference of opinion as to the relative importance of the several traits. The relative values of a given trait, as indicated by individual opinions in the survey, varied from 1 to 10. However, when all opinions were averaged the range was only from 1 to 1.7. In view of these data and the belief that appropriate values will depend almost entirely upon the situation, no weights have been recommended in this estimate scale.

Each commanding officer would fill in, on page 2 of one form (See Fig. 5 of Appendix) the names of the junior officers in his command who graduated in the last class at the Naval Academy, and on the same page of a duplicate form those who came at approximately the same time from N.R.O.T.C. Units. All on each list would then be marked on a scale of 1 to 9 (low to high) in answer to each question before turning the page to the next question. When all traits have been considered, the total score for each officer is obtained and

should be recorded in Column 2 of page 16 (see Fig. 19 of Appendix) and a rank order of overall leadership ability is thereby indicated and should be recorded in Column 3 of the same page. By totalling all the single trait scores, i.e. the scores on each page of the form, a relative comparison of the whole group by traits may be obtained. A comparison of the average score of the N.A. graduate with that of the N.R.O.T.C. graduate would indicate the relative ability of the two groups in that operating unit. This latter comparison should, however, be viewed with caution since there is likely to be some bias toward one group or the other in such a subjective estimate.

The value to be obtained from this type of information from the field of operation will depend upon the analysis and interpretation which it receives in the hands of the training activity. If it indicates weaknesses in the training program or in the evaluation procedure being used either in the fleet or in the training unit, it will then be of value only if steps are taken to strengthen and improve the systems.

APPENDIX

REPORT OF DEMONSTRATED LEADERSHIP ABILITY

1 May, 19__

U.S.S. _____ Attached to _____ Fleet

The purpose of this report is to gather information from the fleet which will enable the officer training institutions (Naval Academy and NROTC Units) to improve the leadership training of midshipmen. It is desired to obtain an evaluation of the ability to lead as demonstrated by newly commissioned junior officers during their first few months of commissioned service. In order to send to the fleet young officers with increasing leadership ability, the training activities are in need of a better estimate of the observed abilities and weaknesses of recent graduates than a survey of their fitness reports will provide. The information contained in this report will NOT become a part of any officer's file or record, nor will it have any effect upon present or future duty assignment. The report may be based solely upon the observations of the commanding officer or upon the observations of other officers or a combination of both. This information should be indicated in space provided. The marking should be done only after careful consideration of the characteristics of the officers being marked. Answer the questions on this page last. Detailed instructions for the completion of this report are given on page 2.

General operations since this group reported for duty. _____

_____ class graduating in 19____.
NA or NROTC

Reported on board approximately _____ 19 ____.

What, in your opinion, are the most noticeable weaknesses of this group? _____

Considering this group as a whole how would you rate their technical ability compared to their leadership ability? (1 to 10)

Technical ability _____ Leadership ability _____

This report is based on observation by: Commanding Officer _____
: Others Officers _____
: Both _____

[illegible]

Page 2 of Post-training Evaluation Report.
(pages 1 and 2-8"x10" back to back)

2. Does he have ability to deal with others under all circumstances without giving offense?
9 - Maintains good will under most difficult circumstances.
7 - Gets along well with others; considerate.
5 - Seldom gives offense; pleasant.
3 - Occasionally annoys or embarrasses others.
1 - Always rubbing people the wrong way.

Figure 7

Heading for page 4 of Post-training
Evaluation Report.

3. Is he fair, just and impartial?
9 - Totally unbiased.
7 - Described by most as a "Square Shooter".
5 - Occasionally shows favoritism; probably unintentional.
3 - Tends to play favorites to advantage
1 - Decidedly prejudiced.

Figure 8

Heading for page 5 of Post-training
Evaluation Report.

4. To what extent does he hold self-respect above personal gain?
9 - Has courage of his convictions; completely reliable; highly respected by everyone.
7 - Exhibits good self-discipline; trust him with confidence.
5 - Tends to cover up own errors; prone to rationalize to personal advantage.
3 - Blames others for own failures; shifts ideals to fit situation.
1 - Takes advantage of others at every opportunity.

Figure 9

Heading for page 6 of Post-training
Evaluation Report.

5. Does everyone, you, his messmates and his men trust him?
9 - Scrupulously honest and trustworthy. 7 - Have confidence in his reliability. 5 - Seldom fails to keep his word. 3 - Accept his word but usually check on him. 1 - Can't believe a thing he says.

Figure 10.

Heading for page 7 of Post-
training Evaluation Report

6. Is he content to "be himself"?
9 - Equally at ease with juniors or seniors; readily adjusts to level of associates. 7 - Moderately reserved but unassuming; modest. 5 - Rank conscious; aloof. 3 - Tends to exaggerate own status; boastful; conceited. 1 - Self-inflated; egotistical; "stuck up".

Figure 11.

Heading for page 8 of Post-
training Evaluation Report

7. How quickly does he spot a problem and its possibilities?
9 - Alert and unusually quick to size up a situation. 7 - Can usually adjust himself well; learns with ease. 5 - Cautious, methodical thinker; not quick in an emergency. 3 - Occasionally repeats same mistake; slow thinker. 1 - Never seems to learn; makes same mistakes repeatedly.

Figure 12.

Heading for page 9 of Post-
training Evaluation Report

8. Considering his experience, is he professionally well informed?
9 - Outstanding in any job; extremely well prepared.
7 - Seems to have good general understanding.
5 - Reliable after considerable training.
3 - Requires frequent assistance and checking.
1 - Seems to be lost in any type of work.

Figure 13.

Heading for page 10 of Post-training Evaluation Report.

9. Does he show faith in his own ability?
9 - Able and very confident.
7 - Will try anything once.
5 - Accepts responsibility with caution.
3 - Avoids test of ability if he can do so gracefully.
1 - Shuns all responsibility; "just knows he can't" so won't try.

Figure 14.

Heading for page 11 of Post-training Evaluation Report.

10. How completely does he hold himself liable for his own actions and those of his men?
9 - Readily assumes responsibility for failure and always shares credit.
7 - Accepts responsibility gracefully; modest in success.
5 - Responsible for self only; gets fair cooperation from his men.
3 - Ready with excuses; shuns responsibility.
1 - Expert buck passer but hogs any credit.

Figure 15.

Heading for page 12 of Post-training Evaluation Report.

11. How well does he control his emotions?
9 - Readily controls or displays emotions to maximum profitable effect.
7 - Controls emotions well but with obvious effort when under strain.
5 - Maintains control under normal circumstances; nervous under strain.
3 - Unreliable in an emergency; shows feelings readily.
1 - Very excitable; goes to pieces easily.

Figure 16.

Heading for page 13 of Post-training Evaluation Report.

12. How patient, conscientious and persevering is he?
9 - Hard worker; sees every job through; inspires others.
7 - Can be relied upon to do his share.
5 - Performs assigned tasks with occasional prodding.
3 - Clock watcher; does only enough to get by.
1 - Lazy; easily discouraged, doesn't care.

Figure 17.

Heading for page 14 of Post-training Evaluation Report.

13. How well does he go ahead on his own in the absence of specific instructions?
9 - Requires the minimum of supervision; gets results; looks ahead and prepares.
7 - Usually takes necessary action without instructions.
5 - Needs general supervision; usually works out own details.
3 - Seldom takes action without specific orders or authority.
1 - Does nothing unless given detailed supervision.

Figure 18.

Heading for page 15 of Post-training Evaluation Report.

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